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ABSTRACT
Value Line Investment Survey asserts that their
Group 1 ranked securities have outperformed lower ranked
stocks with remarkable consistency for over twelve years.
However, many have criticized their tests as inconclusive.
This thesis is a Value Line performance analysis
covering the period of November 1971 through December 1977.
The sample includes the 100 stocks ranked 1 for year ahead
appreciation, assembled in an equally weighted portfolio.
The test utilizes regression analysis to compare the excess
returns on the Value Line portfolio (Value Line portfolio
returns -Treasury Bill returns), the dependent variable, and
the excess market return, (three different indices, equally
and value weighted, Standard and Poor's "500")the independent
variable.
The Value Line ex-post alpha, for trading on the
publication date (-5, 0, 5, 10, 20 days delay analyzed),
regressed on the equally weighted portfolio (the best per-
forming of the market indices), indicates a positive 12%
yearly extra return, with a t-statistic of 3.6 , significant
at over the 99% confidence level.
-3-
This result, significant and large, suggests that
Value Line recommended investment strategies which consist-
ently outperform the market, contradicting extensive litera-
ture documenting the efficiency of capital markets.
Thesis Supervisor: Fischer Black
Title: Professor of Finance
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INTRODUCTION
Samuelson, in a short article,1 touches upon many
of the points which the careful reader should keep in mind
while reading this performance evaluation of the Value Line
investment service.
He speaks of the advantage of portfolio diversifica-
tion, and warns that holding a large number of securities
does not in itself ensure efficient diversification since
they may be strongly positively correlated.
He also speaks of portfolio performance evaluation,
and the appearance of superior performance by increasing risk
through leverage in upmarket periods. Use of regression
analysis and the capital asset pricing model will aid in a
clearer understanding of the results of this study.
Samuelson also warns that even if an investment ad-
visory service such as Value Line should beat the market, it
may be due only to chance. Within this thesis the statisti-
cal tests will be performed to provide proof or rejection of
the null hypothesis at a statistically significant level.
After reading this paper, one question is still
sure to remain. If Value Line has produced better results
than a passive strategy, does this imply anything for their
expected future performance?
-11-
Chapter 1
VALUE LINE: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Arnold Bernhard, Research Director of the Value
Line Investment Survey, in a 1970 presentation at the
University of Chicago, presented exhibits which indicated
Value Line Investment Survey had a consistently good pre-
dictive ability. He said that unless his results of statis-
tical analysis are pure luck, they contradict the random
walk hypothesis.
Fischer Black, my thesis advisor, entered this
debate at the conference by presenting the evidence for
passive portfolio management. He felt that the Value Line
performance results were impressive, but that the statistical
tests were inadequate. His objection is based on the fact
that Value Line order ranked utilizing cross-sectional tests
which indicated little about statistical significance. Black
prefers the use of regression testing for consistency of
performance. It is this method which I will employ in the
original research contained in this thesis.
The objective of an actively managed portfolio of
common stocks is to choose securities so that there is a
greater return than when an index fund is purchased.
The choice of misvalued securities must overcome the conse-
quential costs of churning the portfolio. In addition, a
-12-
market timing approach can be taken to take advantage of
financial market movements, and hopefully help avoid having
funds invested during declining periods in the equities mar-
kets. The active/passive investment decision will be
examined in detail, including an overview of current research
in financial theory of efficient markets.
Value Line ranks 100 stocks in Group 1, the highest
category for year ahead performance. Implied is an advantage
to holding more than one security, otherwise investing a
large portion of your assets in what they consider the number
one best stock would be recommended. 3
Harry Markowitz analyzed investor behavior and dis-
covered that investors generally try to maximize returns
while avoiding risk. He believes that the important charac-
teristics of a portfolio of stocks are the expected return and
the riskiness. Intelligent rational investors should natu-
rally hold that combination of risky assets which maximize
expected returns for a given degree of risk. Markowitz
identified that with the knowledge of a securities expected
return, variance, and covariance with the market, that
efficient portfolios could be created. This is the theory
which Value Line simplifies into the recommendation that
each investor should hold at least 16 to 25 of their Group 1
securities, and also the reason I chose to analyze the port-
folio of all Group 1 securities. The general formula for
-13-
computing the variance of a portfolio is:
2 N N
up= x.x coviy
i=l i=l i y
xi = proportion invested in security i
xy = proportion invested in security y
coviy = covariance between the rates of return
on i and y
also
CAB
rab
SA SB
where
CAB = covariance between return on A and
return on B
rab = coefficient of correlation between
return on A and return on B
SA = standard deviation of A
SB = standard deviation of B
These equations show that diversification does not
help when security returns are perfectly positively corre-
lated. However diversification can eliminate risk with per-
fectly negatively correlated securities. In the case of
partial correlation as found in Value Line portfolios Group 1,
diversification lends an advantage, since in theory an
investor is only rewarded for bearing market risk represented
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by beta rather than total risk6 represented by sigma - or
what Value Line has computed by the name "Rank for Safety."
Value Line recommends that if one holds fewer than
15 of their Group 1 securities, the "safety rank" or total
risk view, is a valid measure. But if one holds more than
15 securities, in different industries, one should be only
concerned with betas, since the portfolio would then be
fairly well diversified.
In order to better understand how Value Line makes
stock recommendations, let us examine the criteria used in
their performance studies and analyses.
Value Line computes the rank of approximately 1700
stocks each week. The financial analysis is condensed into
two numbers, one conveying information about how the stock
rates in the sample of about 1700, relative to expected price
performance in the next 12 months. The second measure is an
indication of investment safety, or total risk of the indi-
vidual security.
Value Line publishers explain their rankings as
follows: Value Line rank definitions,
100 stocks Rank 1: Expect the best price performance
relative to the other stocks covered in the
survey.
300 stocks Rank 2: Expect above average price performance.
-15-
900 stocks Rank 3: Expect price performance in line
with the market.
300 stocks Rank 4: Expect below average price performance.
100 stocks Rank 5: Expect poorest price performance in
relation to the other covered stocks.
Other studies of Value Line have examined the stocks
in each of these rank portfolios to determine if the expected
results hold true. Value Line claims "not every stock will
perform in accordance with its rank in every year. But such
a high percentage have in the past for logical reasons based
on earnings, growth rates, and risk, that the probabilities
definately stand in your favor when you line up your stocks
with the Value Line Ranks."
If Value Line does have the ability to discriminate
between securities in the ranking method, an obvious strategy
would involve the purchase of Rank 1 securities and the short
sale of Rank 5 securities. Although according to Value Line
literature this would be a strategy, it is not examined in
the paper.
I studied only those securities ranked 1, to deter-
mine whether their Rank 1 performance was superior to that
of various market indices. Value Line is mailed on a
schedule that is aimed to assure delivery to the subscriber
on Friday. In my analysis I refer to "x" days delay in
acting upon Value Line advice. A zero delay means you would
-16-
act on the Friday you receive the survey. A five day delay
is five Stock Exchange days, or most likely seven days. Like-
wise, a delay of 20 Stock Exchange days would be about four
weeks. I also analyze a negative delay, a hypothetical
strategy of acting on the advice five days early. I consider
this important both academically and because it is a strategy
which could be ollowed by a person who understands how the
Value Line ranks are computed.
In a letter of June 2, 1978 written by Samuel
Eisenstadt, Chief Statistician of Value Line to Fischer
Black;
"Most subscribers receive the survey on Friday,
some even on Thursday. The rankings are deter-
mined 7-12 days prior to the subscriber's receipt
of the survey ... subscribers that are acquainted
with the mechanics of the ranking system can
successfully anticipate rank changes by following
earnings reports in the Wall Street Journal. For
example if a Group 1 stock comes out with a poor
quarterly earnings report he need not wait 7-12
days to be told that the ranking has been lowered."
Therefore I thought it would be interesting to look
at the five day negative time delay. However although
rankings appear to be about a week 'stale' by the time the
subscriber receives the survey, I am sure that in the case
of a major development, the ranking could be altered until
the survey is printed on Wednesday evening. I do not believe
in the likelihood that a subscriber could duplicate the
results obtained by following Value Line a week early.
-17-
However the zero day delay is the strategy that subscribers
could duplicate.
Value Line's performance record is regularly re-
ported in their publication as demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2.
These two tables, assembled by Value Line, show the results
that an investor would have received following Value Line
recommendations from April 1965 through July 5, 1978. The
Value Line analysis assumes, in the case of no allowance for
rank changes, that an investor buys an equal dollar amount of
each stock of each rank at the start of each year and holds
an unchanged portfolio for the entire year. At the start of
the next year the portfolio is rebalanced. Allowance for
rank changes in the portfolio is updated weekly. There are
no allowances for transaction costs.
The compilation of Value Line table statistics
utilizes geometric averages of price changes in each period.
When dealing with portfolio performance,9 a compounding of
arithmetic averages of price changes would have simulated
an actual portfolio strategy.
Tables 3 and 4 present data compiled by Value Line
applied to an institutional universe of common stocks --
Standard and Poor's "500" stock Composite Index. This analy-
sis was executed to disprove the belief by some that Value
Line is capable of discriminating only in that segment of
the market made up of small, inactively traded "secondary
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stocks" that may be inefficiently priced. Therefore Value
Line assembled this data to demonstrate performance on that
segment of the market considered by most to be the most
well analyzed and efficiently priced.
The rankings assume that a position was taken at
the beginning of each year and held for 12 months without
ranks changes. 1 0 Table 3 summarizes recent changes in price
for an equally weighted portfolio. Table 4 contains total
returns figures, change in price plus dividends, and is
also equally weighted. These tables show that results for
the Standard and Poor's "500" stocks show discrimination,
and question the validity of efficient market theory.
Value Line describes their statistical analytical
technique as "Investing in Common Stocks." I will summarize
Value Line's criteria for computing a rank for price per-
formance of the next 12 months. Their four main criteria
are:
1. Non-parametric value position
2. Magnitude of over or underevaluation
3. Earnings momentum
4. Earnings surprise factor
The non-parametric value position of each stock
concerns a price-earnings measure. Relative earning and
11prices of all Value Line stocks for the same period. A
price momentum factor is also included in order to help
-21-
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predict future action. This measure is used to combine
earnings, rank, price rank, and price momentum into one
figure.
The magnitude of over or underevaluation is a measure
used by Value Line's analysts to "measure the disparity be-
tween current price-earnings ratio of a stock and its
historical norm. l2
Earnings momentum is a function of the year-to-year
change in quarterly earnings per share of each stock.
The earning surprise factor seems to be a convenient
way to integrate new or unexpected information into the
ratings.
This explanation is what Value Line claims they do to
estimate stock values. Of course we don't know their method
for sure -- however this is what they claim to do.
Utilizing these many measures of performance and
analytical predictive ability, Value Line attempts to refute
the efficient market hypothesis by demonstrating accurate
active portfolio management.
Burton G. Malkiel defines the random walk as "The
history of stock-price movements contains no useful informa-
tion that will enable an investor consistently to outperform
or buy and hold strategy in managing a portfolio." 1 3
Scholars have defined three forms of the efficient
market hypothesis. The weak form asserts that current stock
-24-
prices reflect all information from historical prices, i.e.,
one cannot apply a mechanical formula to past stock prices
to beat the market. The semistrong form of the hypothesis
is that in analyzing public knowledge or charting the under-
lying companies does not produce superior investment results.
The strong form does not produce superior investment results.
The strong form goes so far as to say that even those indivi-
duals with insider information cannot make use of this
information to produce superior stock market returns.1 4 If
these strong forms of the efficient market hypothesis are
true, it appears Value Line could not achieve superior
stock market returns.
-25-
Chapter 2
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY
A survey of recent financial literature on previous
empirical research on Value Line, produced five outstanding
performance analysis articles. This section summarizes the
findings and relates the highlights of earlier works.
John P. Shelton in "The Value Line Contest - A Test
"1
of the Predictability of Stock Price Changes, studies the
results of a large number of individual investment decisions
on the 1965-1966 Value Line contest. The contest was a pro-
motional device. Appropriately named, a contest of stock
market judgment, which attracted 18,565 entrants.
Each contestant chose 25 stocks from a list supplied
by Value Line made up of securities they ranked four or five
on November 26, 1965. The rules assumed that each contestant
would form an equally weighted portfolio with a value computed
at the close of the market on December 31, 1965. Value Line
analysts selected their own portfolio of stocks from those
that were ranked Group 1. Prizes were awarded to those indi-
viduals who chose portfolios which outperformed Value Line
by the greatest margins.
The question Shelton asks is "Did the 18,565 con-
testants select portfolios, on average, that differed from
the performance of the 350 stocks to which the selection was
-26-
confined by enough to conclude that the result was not likely
to have happened by chance?" 2 Shelton found that the 350
stocks ranked four and five experienced a 5.9 loss in
value over the 26 week contest period. The range of stock
price changes for individual securities ranged from a doubling
in value to 202.5% to a two-thirds decline in value to 64.7%.
Shelton discovered that the average score achieved by the
contestants was approximately 49 standard deviations greater
than the expected mean. He states, "It is extremely unlikely
that a difference as large as this would have occurred if the
price changes during those six months were so truly random."3
Shelton seriously questions the existence of effi-
cient markets, based on the superior performance of a large
sample of individual investors. This doubt is limited, of
course, to the six month period of the Value Line contest.
Warren H. Hausman in "A Note on the Value Line
Contest: A Test of the Predictability of Stock-Price Changes"
calls attention to what he considers an inappropriate statis-
tical test used in Shelton's paper. He concludes "The fact
that investors (or contest entrants) tend to agree with
each other (as Shelton found) need not mean that they know
anything of value. Neither does the fact that, on a single
occasion, they outperformed a random selection of stocks."4
Hausman suggests additional observations during different
time periods.
-27-
John Michael Murphy studied and performed analysis
on the 1969 Value Line contest. Murphy's results are in
agreement with Shelton's and cast doubt on the usefulness of
the random walk hypothesis when describing the stock market.
The 1969 contest rules differed from those in 1965. Con-
testants were allowed to choose their portfolios from any of
the 1,258 stocks Value Line analyzed at the time. One of
Murphy's conclusions is: "The results reported are signifi-
cant and inconsistent with the spirit of the random walk
hypothesis, but statistical, logical, and methodological
considerations preclude a claim that the hypothesis has been
rej ected."6
The next Value Line inquiry was conducted by Robert
S. Kaplan and Roman L. Weil in an article, "Risk and the
Value Line Contest." 7 This contest covered the period from
August 18, 1972 to February 16, 1973. The authors hypothe-
sized that given efficient markets, stock prices would
simultaneously adjust at the publication or release of all
new information, including analysis performed by Value Line.
They believed that a high beta, high risk, portfolio should
do well when the market rises, and perform poorly when there
is a general drop in price levels. A low risk portfolio
should perform better than the high risk portfolio when
there is a market decline.
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Kaplan and Weil did not believe they could pick 25
stocks that could outperform the market. They thought that it
made sense to enter two portfolios, a very high beta portfolio,
and a very low beta portfolio. If the market moved in either
direction, they could take advantage of the situation. The
high beta portfolio had a beta of 2.13 and the low risk
portfolio by their estimates a beta of 0.21. The average
Value Line rank of the two portfolios was about equal, which
would naturally lead to an expectation from Value Line of
about equal performance.
Their results were computed during a period when
prices for all stocks in the Value Line survey declined 6.7%.
The author's low beta portfolio actually increased in value
3.8%, placing it in the top 2,043 of the 85,744 portfolios
entered. The high beta portfolio declined 22.9% and scored
in the bottom 519 of the 89,744 portfolios entered.
The results support the authors' hypothesis. They
showed the expected results according to the beta theory of
portfolio performance. In their conclusion, Kaplan and Weil
say "The rankings are flawed, since much of the variation in
performance is caused by differences in the risk of stocks
in each group."8 The Kaplan and Weil study chose portfolios
with equal Value Line rank but with different levels of
risk. The return on these portfolios differs by more than
26 percentage points. During the same time period, Value
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Line Group 1 and Group 5 portfolios had approximately equal
risk in a beta context, but return differed by only 3 percen-
tage points in performance, despite differential Value Line
ratings. They concluded that detailed investigation of in-
dividual securities is not worthwhile and that stock market
movements are dominated by systematic risk.
The next study of Value Line was performed by
Professor Fischer Black, "Yes Virginia, There Is Hope; Tests
of the Value Line Ranking System."9 This thesis is closely
modeled after Black's paper, with three important differences.
1) Black's observations of Value Line rankings and stock
prices were monthly, while mine are weekly; 2) Black looked
at all the Value Line ranks in his study period. This study
looks into Group 1 rank and compares Group 1 stock perfor-
mance to various market indices; 3) Black did his study in
cooperation with Value Line, who performed the actual computa-
tions. This thesis is independently written and researched.
Black states "According to the analysis that Value
Line performed with my help, its ranking system appears to
be one of the few exceptions to the rule that attempts to
separate good stocks from bad stocks is futile."1 0 Professor
Black observed of Value Line, "The system tends to assign
high marks to stocks with low price earning ratios, relative
to historical norms, and relative to the price earnings
ratio of the market." 11
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Discussing shortcomings of previous Value Line
analysis, Black says "Cross-sectional tests generally tell
you nothing about statistical significance, or whether per-
formance in one period is likely to be repeated in future
periods." 12 Black favors regression testing which is the
method he suggested for this thesis. He also examines the
implications of transaction costs and he discusses ways of
utilizing the ranks to minimize transaction costs. In con-
cluding, he states "The net result of the portfolio simula-
tion, assuming transaction costs of two percent or less in
and out, was that the strategy continued to give significant
results over the five year period, although the level of
significance was reduced somewhat." 13
This has been a survey of the research leading up to
my analysis of Value Line. Each study concentrated on a
slightly different aspect of active portfolio management.
Nevertheless each concluded that there is at least some ques-
tion as to the validity of the efficient market hypothesis.
Hopefully this performance study will provide another piece
of evidence.
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Chapter 3
FINANCIAL THEORY - EFFICIENT MARKET - RANDOM WALK
The efficient market hypothesis is at the heart of
this research. If Value Line can discriminate undervalued
securities, then surely a re-evaluation is due to the pre-
supposed degree of efficiency in markets. This section will
provide an overview of the most well known previous investi-
gations into efficient markets and stock market performance
studies.
In a test of efficient markets, Fama1 studied the
proportionate price changes of the 30 Dow Jones industrial
stock for the period 1957-1967. He found serial correlations
very low, the average being 03.2 To adjust for the domina-
t:ion in his correlation coefficients of just a few extreme
observations, Fama also examined only signs, (+ or -), rather
than size of successive days, statistics to determine if runs
persisted. He found a negligible departure from randomness.
HHis study provides strong support for the random walk hypo-
thesis.3
Another test of efficient markets was performed by
William F. Sharpe.4 He studied 34 mutual funds from 1954 to
1963. Sharpe takes account of rates of return as measured
5by total risk, variability, utilizing the capital asset
pricing model. The capital asset pricing model expresses a
linear relationship between risk and return on a portfolio.
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This presupposes the condition that the portfolio is efficient,
meaning that the portfolio provides maximum returns for a
given level of risk. Sharpe found that if expenses of the
funds are ignored, 15 of the 34 funds outperform the Dow
Jones industrial average after risk adjusting. If expenses
are considered only 11 funds beat the Dow Jones average while
23 did worse. Sharpe's conclusion is that mutual funds failed
to consistently outperform the market, implying an efficient
market.6 He states "... support(ing) to the view that capital
market is largely efficient and that good managers concentrate
on evaluating risk and providing diversification, spending
little effort (and money) on the search for incorrectly
priced securities."7
Another study of mutual fund performance was under-
taken by Michael Jensen8 covering the performance of 115
mutual funds from 1945-1964. Jensen understood that varia-
tions in fund performance was expected because of difference
in the fund's risk. His method involved comparison of an
individual fund's performance with the performance of a
randomly selected portfolio of equal risk.9
When ignoring mutual fund expenses, about half of
the funds did better, and half worse than expected. "This
is the result that would be expected if the market were
highly efficient with market prices fully reflecting all
that was knowable through public announcement or
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ascertainable through the efforts of individual security
analysts. 10
When accounting for expenses only 43 out of 115
mutual funds showed superior performance. Jensen's work
in the evaluation of mutual fund performance provided addi-
tional support for the random walk hypothesis. "The evidence
on mutual fund performance discussed above indicates not only
that these 115 mutual funds were on average not able to pre-
dict security prices well enough to outperform or buy and hold
policy, but also that there is very little evidence that any
individual fund was able to do significantly better than
that which we expected from mere random chance."ll
William Sharpe in "Adjusting for Risk in Portfolio
Performance Measurement" 1 2 shows that adjusting for risk
properly is the way to accurate performance evaluations.
S.harpe describes methodology used in this Value Line study
involving the computation of the excess return for each
period, being the difference behind a portfolio return and
Treasury Bill returns.13 He states that in times of greatly
varying short term interest rates, it is essential to utilize
the excess return methodology to obtain meaningful study
results. He also-speaks of a reward to variability, measure
and a model of naive investor behavior as necessary parts
of a performance study. Exactly what he is advising is to
be aware of risk, as it is important measure on performance
-34-
evaluation.
William Sharpe wrote another article "Likely Gains
from Market Timing"l 4 which I include in this overview because
of the suspicion that Value Line may attempt market timing
decisions in the adjustment of the average beta of their
portfolios. This article tries to address the question, how
superior must one's predictions be to implement a market
timing style effectively? "Attempts to time the market are
not likely to produce incremental returns of more than four
per cent per year over the long run. Moreover, unless a
manager can predict whether the market will be good or bad
each year with considerable accuracy (e.g., be right at
least seven times out of ten) he should probably avoid
attempts to time the market altogether." 1 5
Jeffrey Jaffee in "Special Information and Insider
Trading"1 6 provides insights regarding the strong form of the
efficient market hypothesis. He summized that only "inten-
sive trading samples yield profits greater than commissions"
regarding usefulness of insider information.17 Jaffee's
study also suggested a profit opportunity: but one smaller
than is found in this Value Line study. Roger Ibbotson also
supports the efficient market hypothesis as it applies to
new issues of common stock. "We cannot reject the hypothesis
that an investor in a single random issue has an equal
chance for a gain or loss ... The results generally confirm
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that there are no departures from market efficiency in the
after market. 18
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes lend insight into
the determinant of active portfolio management. They state
that as an individual trading on superior information, such
as Value Line recommendations, you are competing with other
individuals who are following the same strategy:
"As a group those who trade on information cannot
make money. If some individuals make money by
deviating from the market portfolio, then other
individuals must lose money by deviation from
the market portfolio. All individuals together
hold the market portfolio... An investor who
trades on information incurs substantial costs
from his activity. He may spend money gathering
and analyzing the information he uses. He incurs
transaction costs when he buys and sells. He may
realize gains that he does not have to realize,
and then pay taxes sooner than he has to. He
holds a portfolio that is not as well diversified
as the market." 19
Black and Scholes state that although information
traders do not generally earn superior returns, they help
keep the market efficient by integrating all information
into current stock prices. Black contends that the cost of
in and out brokerage changes on a $40.00 stock is about 3%
for a round lot, but this was before negotiated commissions.
This research all seems to say that Value Line must show
impressive performance to overcome all of the disadvantages
of active portfolio management and provide its subscribers.
with risk adjusted superior returns.
-36-
Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
This section of the thesis describes topics ranging
from data collection to regression testing. The intent is to
provide a precise explanation of the research in enough detail
to support further research and expansion by a future his-
torian. It is important for the reader to understand that
this performance study was done independently of Value Line,
or of any other commericial enterprise. No direct contact
was made with the Value Line organization, nor was any data
supplied directly by them.
All Value Line information was hand collected from
publicly available sources. The data from November 5, 1971
to December 30, 1977 was collected and put into machine
readable form. The Value Line Group 1 portfolio, each con-
taining 100 stocks, were recorded on a weekly basis. The
Dewey Library at M.I.T., Harvard's Baker Library, Boston
Public Library as well as the libraries at Northeastern,
Boston University and Wellesley College, were cooperative in
:Locating back dated Value Line reports. Mr. Evan Shulman
of Batterymarch helped fill in the final gaps.
Study was concentrated on those 100 stocks Value
Line ranked highest for year ahead performance. Initially
we thought this would encompass hand coding the 100 stocks
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each week for the entire 321 week period.
It is more efficient to code only the initial port-
folio on November 5, 1971, and record only the weekly addi-
tions and deletions. With this information a computer program
can generate weekly stock portfolios, resulting in a 90%
savings in information quantity which it was necessary for
computer readable form.
This method provided ease in obtaining many spot
accuracy checks. Each week's portfolio updates were recorded
on 3x5 index cards which were headed with the date. The
analysis is limited to those Value Line securities listed on
the New York and American Stock Exchanges. This is because
the CRSP data base included only those securities. However,
the index card weekly update file contains listings of over-
the-counter securities for possible future research efforts.
Upon completion of the index card weekly update
file, each company name was manually coded with its unique
identifier, an eight digit ICUSIP number. It is this identi-
fier, supplied by the Stock Exchange, which is punched onto
weekly update computer cards to act as input to the port-
folio generation program. The ICUSIP numbers were coded from
a list containing all stocks on the above mentioned exchanges.
Whenever a stock name from the index card file was not
located on the computer generated tape identifier number list,
it was assumed to be a security listed on the over-the-
-38-
counter market and therefore outside the realm of this
study. Roughly three per cent of the Value Line Group 1
recommendations are over-the-counter securities. I believe
ignoring these stocks will have little effect on this analysis
since I see no obvious reason that Value Line should be
better able to discriminate over-the-counter securities. One
may consider the over-the-counter portion of the market less
efficient, and more open to fundamental and technical analy-
sis. If that were truly the case, Value Line would include
more over-the-counter securities in their universe.
Compilation of the portfolio update list is straight-
forward for the two most recent years. For this period,
Value Line presents newly added securities to Group 1 rank
with a box next to the name. From 1975 chronologically
reversed, the task is more difficult in that weekly updates
are not easily identified. The method is standardized by
reliance on the "Summary of Advice Section," a list of 100
Group 1 rank for year ahead performance. Adjacent week lists
are compared, and additions and differences were discerned
by discrepancies in the adjacent lists.
The Value Line publication is only satisfactory in
transmitting their analyst's recommendations to the subscri-
ber. The publisher lets pass many spelling and alphabetiza-
tion errors serious enough to cause doubt in the subscriber's
mind as to exactly what action was recommended.
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Value Line utilizes an up arrow symbol (A) to indi-
cate an upward valuation in rank, similarly a down arrow
indicates a drop in rank (V). Mysteriously, in copies of the
reports I found triangle arrows pointing in most conceivable
rotations.
The recorded errors in Value Line are diverse. In
some cases, the same stock was dropped from Group 1 in two
consecutive weeks, or just claim to drop it, only to confuse
the subscriber by it's appearance as a Group 1 on the follow-
ing week. Although the restraint of the portfolio remaining
stable at the 100 stock level implies an equal number of
additions and deletions per week, this is not always the case.
Prior to 1975, the Value Line information supplied
was more difficult to utilize. For example, on April 11, 1975
the recommendation was made to drop Norton-Simon from Rank 1.
This was confusing considering that the previous week's
Group 1 did not contain Norton-Simon. Value Line also recom-
mended dropping Outlet Company, which was not in Rank 1. On
July 21, 1974 Value Line identified Tyler Corporation as in
Group 2 with an up arrow (A), signifying that it had just
been promoted from Group 3. However, in the Summary of
Advice section, Value Line recommended that this stock be
dropped from the Group 1 portfolio. The arrow had been re-
versed. Furthermore, the July 21, 1974 survey may have been
incorrectly dated July 19, 1974. Value Line recommended
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adding Entex to Group 1 on April 29, 1977, even though it
was already in the Group 1 portfolio. On December 28, 1973
Barber Oil was listed with an (A) as an addition to Group 1,
however it was not added to the Summary of Advice Group 1
list. To compound the error, and maintain 100 stocks in the
portfolio, Value Line continued to maintain Greater Washington
Investments as Group 1, while listing it as a drop candidate
with a down arrow (V). Again on December 28, 1973, Koehring
was dropped from the Summary of Advice's Group 1 -- however,
:Lt was not labeled with a 2 down arrow (), but was maintained
a Group 1. It was lowered in rank a week later, without
mention of the apparent discrepancy. A more serious error
occurred on December 21, 1973 when 101 stocks were listed as
belonging to Group 1. In trying to cope with these errors
one must rely on the Summary of Advice section as being
correct and one must behave as a typical, rational investor.
Note that one cannot go back to the original reports for
verification since those full page reports are published
only four times a year, and therefore are likely to be out-
dated.
When the data was coded it consisted of 917 dif-
ferent companies with roughly five additions and five dele-
tions each week. Some weeks there were no changes to the
portfolio, and other weeks, those which coincided with many
quarterly company earnings reports publication contained
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roughly 30 portfolio updates. The data span a 321 week
period.
Computer Program 1: Weekly Portfolio Generation
The function of computer Program 1, which was written
in FORTRAN, was to translate the initial stock portfolio
and weekly updates into a sequence of data identified weekly
portfolios. For input, the Program required the initial
portfolio and data cards in the following format:
Date + or - ICUSIP Number (8 digit)
YYMMDD + Stock 1, Stock 2, Stock 3 ....
The Program generated output to a disk storage
file. This output consisted of: weekly portfolios, cumula-
tive stock list and number, date list and week number. As a
verification of sample data check, the program detected and
printed error messages if the add or drop symbol was incor-
rect, if an attempt was made to drop a company not in the
current portfolio, or if one tried to add a stock that
already existed in the Group 1 domain. The program main-
tained updated portfolios in numerical (alphabetical) order.
The programs are reproduced in the Appendices.
Computer Program 2: Stock Name Portfolio Verification
Program 2 was designed solely for data verification
purposes. It consists of two parts. The first reads the
CRSP (Chicago Research in Security Prices) computer tapes
and stores the names of the companies previously identified
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by ICUSIP numbers. The second half of the Program prints
weekly portfolios, identifying companies by name. Inputs
included two volume CRSP data tapes, disk file of weekly
portfolios from Program 1, and a disk file of the cumulative
company list from Program 1. The output is a cumulative
list of companies names, a printout of weekly stock port-
folios by name, and a list of bad ICUSIP numbers, that is,
numbers not found on the CRSP tapes. This may be due to read
errors, or more likely because there is no company issued to
that ICUSIP number, in which case a keypunch error is un-
covered. This output was compared to the original Value Line
survey to provide data verification.
Computer Program 3: Variable Vector Displacement
Returns Generation.
Program 3 performed all of the computation for the
thesis. It required two megabytes of core storage and ten
cylinders of temporary disk storage. (Including tape mount-
ing charges it cost roughly $50.00 per run.) Inputs to
Program 3 included complete CRSP daily stock returns, 2
volume tapes, a cumulative list of 917 companies, a weekly
data list, weekly portfolio composition, and calendar of
vector addresses of returns on tape. Output of Program 3
contains a disk file of weekly market returns, a disk file
of weekly Group 1 portfolio returns, and cumulative returns.
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This program computed weekly market returns from the
daily returns on the tape. It also calculated Group 1 port-
folio weekly returns from the individual stock daily returns
and then formed the 100 stock portfolio.
Two decisions were made when writing Program 3. The
first was to equally weight the Value Line portfolio of Group
1 securities. The second involved the choice of the market
indices to read from the CRSP tape. This program also pro-
vided the researcher with the option to simulate different
purchasing acquisitions delays around the Value Line publica-
tion date. It was run for each of these variations:
Days (-) Acceleration/Delay Before Trading
on Value Line Recommendation
Run 1 -5 Business days, prior Friday
Run 2 0 Delay, publication date
Run 3 5 Business days, delay, subsequent Friday
Run 4 10 Business days, delay, two weeks
Run 5 20 Business days, delay, four weeks
Most investors receive their copy of the Value Line
survey in the Friday mail. (This was discovered by examina-
tion of the library reception stamps on survey copies.) Due
to the Friday market closing, those prices were used as the
base, zero delay case for my analysis.
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When deciding the choice of a market index, some
believe the best choice was one that most closely represented
the whole market. Such a decision is independent of this,
or any other survey. Another view involves comparing Value
Line's performance with a passive strategy demonstrating a
high correlation, mixed with lending or borrowing. This
could be a technical buy and hold strategy. The comparison
with a highly correlated index would provide a good measure
of whether Value Line does really do better.
Definition of a surrogate for the market is difficult.
Therefore, one must compare the Value Line portfolio to the
three indices; the equally weighted market, the value
weighted market, and the Standard and Poor's "500" composite.
The Value Line portfolio is assembled weekly, buying an equal
dollar amount of each stock ranked 1, selling at the end of
the week, producing a return figure and repeating weekly.
The weighting of an index reflects the representative
importance of each stock. Value weighted indexes are domina-
ted by the larger high capitalization companies. Equally
weighted indexes give greater weight to smaller companies.
A value weighted index oriented or ranked strategy can be
followed by all investors when the individual stocks are
weighted in relation to the company's value. In order for
all investors to hold an equally weighted portfolio, major
capital redistribution must occur.
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The Standard and Poor's "500" composite index in-
cludes 425 industries, 25 railroads and 50 utilities. The
market value of the stocks in this value weighted index
comprise about 80% of the value of the New York Stock
Exchange.
Professor Fischer Black made the suggestion that an
equally weighted index of the stocks listed on the New York
and American Stock Exchanges, may behave similarly to a
value weighted proxy of all capital assets, which is really
the ideal index representation from some points of view.
Another important issue regards market indices and
portfolio evaluation as methods of averaging. These two
most commonly used methods are an arithmetic mean, or a
geometric mean. Value Line uses geometric averages for their
in-house research. Most others use arithmetic measures.
Indices based on geometric means will increase more slowly
and decrease more rapidly than an index based on an arithme-
tic mean. Utilization of an arithmetic mean makes more sense
for comparative performance research. It corresponds to the
performance that could be duplicated by an investor who
rebalances his portfolio each period, to include equal dollar
weights of each included stock. The geometric mean is the
t-h
N root of the product of N observations. The arithmetic
mean is the simple average.
PAGES (S) MISSING FROM ORIGINAL
PAGE 46 IS MISSING
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Computer Program 4: Ibbotson - Sinqufield
Treasury Bill Program
The only program run in the batch mode was the one
to read the Ibbotson - Sinqufield tapes. These tapes pro-
vide the monthly U.S. Treasury Bill returns. This index of
short term rates, of Treasury Bills of the shortest maturity
greater than one month, was utilized as the risk free rate in
the capital asset pricing mode equation. The tapes M.I.T.'s
Sloan School of Management own (supplied by the Center for
Research in Security Prices) end in 1976. I coded by hand
the 1977 returns according to the Ibbotson - Sinqufield pro-
cedure:
RFT = PF, T/Pr, (T-l) -1
Where T=month, R=Treasury Bill Returns, Pr=Price.
I collected the data from the Wall Street Journal. All
monthly returns were compounded to a weekly series for the
regression.
The program environment consisted of FORTRAN, execu-
ted on the conversational monitor system operated under the
IBM Virtual Machine Facility 370. The interactive mode of
operation made data correction, location and verification
easier than under a batch system. The CRSP computer tapes
provided daily stock returns for the American and New York
Stock Exchange universe. Stock return is defined as a
change in total value of an investment for a common stock
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for a period. The returns are completely adjusted for divi-
dends and other distributions.
The last program was written in TSP, Time Series
Processor. It calculates ordinary least square linear regres-
sions on the return data generated by the previous programs.
The output of TSP included estimates of regressional coeffi-
cients, estimates of standard errors, and t-statistics for
the null hypothesis that individual regression coefficients
are not zero, and R
TSP produces a least square linear regression
equasion such that:
y = a + bx such that
Z (y, -y) is minimized
( -x) (y, -y)
z (x1 -x)
a = y - bx
coefficient of determination
2 -2
r = Z (y, -y)
Z (y, -y)
t-statistic (a) or (X)
(y, -2
N-2
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The TSP program takes as inputs; weekly portfolio
returns, weekly equally weighted market returns, weekly
Standard and Poor's "500" returns, and weekly Treasury Bill
returns. The program generates excess returns variables and
performs the following regressions:
Dependent Variable Independent Variable
(Value Line Portfolio (Equally weighted port-
-Treasury Bill Returns) folio -Treasury Bill)
(Value Line Portfolio (Value weighted portfolio
-Treasury Bill) - Treasury Bill)
(Value Line Portfolio (Standard and Poor's port-
--Treasury Bill) / folio -Treasury Bill)
Regressions are performed for the total period as
well as yearly sub-periods. Professor Black recommended the
regression method of testing which he utilized in his Value
Line survey because of its ability to demonstrate consistency
of performance. In order to compare different portfolios a
method must be used to relate the beta, or relative risk, and
interpret the rate of return. Adjustment for the effect of
beta were conducted by examination of the extra return of the
Value Line portfolio after regressing the excess returns of
Value Line on the excess returns of the market (by subtract-
ing out the Treasury Bill Rate). The extra return is repre-
sented by the alpha (a) in the regression equasion. The
Value Line portfolio excess return is the dependent variable.
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RVL -RF = a p (Rm RF)+ p
VL - weekly return on Value Line portfolio
RF = one week Treasury Bill rate, updated monthly
R = return on marked index
m
VL = beta of Value Line
aVL = extra return of Value Line portfolio
EVL = error term, assuming normal distribution
should be zero
If the market is truly efficient, and Value Line
does not have the ability to discriminate over/under valued
securities, alpha (a) should be zero. The t-statistic of the
alpha is the important statistic, dividing alpha by the
standard error, a t-statistic greater than 2 is considered
to allow rejection of the hypothesis that alpha is zero at
the 95% confidence level.
In estimating alpha, considered the measure of
Value Line's performance, the effect of varying risk is ad-
justed regardless of general economic conditions. Market
movements should have no effect on this measure of perfor-
manc e.
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Chapter 5
RESULTS
This thesis tests the hypothesis; the Value Line
investment strategy produces no extra return on a market
portfolio over an eight year test period. Regression
testing adjusts for different sensitivity and risk of
various portfolios. In addition, simple growth figures are
presented. These are not risk normalized, but are still a
good performance measure because the test period is an
almost flat period for the value weighted portfolios in the
growth of equities. This is verified by the performance of
market indices. Observations were weekly unless identified
otherwise.
Table 5 summarizes the results of unadjusted market
growth over the 1971-1977 period. During this eight year
period an initial investment in the Standard and Poor's
"500" index would have just maintained its dollar value,
(non-inflation adjusted), growing to only 1.01 times its
initial investment. (This is an arithmetic average of the
returns presented on the Table.) A value weighted index
did slightly better growing to 1.28 the initial investment.
The equally weighted portfolio showed better performance
growing to 2.35 times the initial investment.
It is difficult to say which index best describes
the true market movements for the period. I favor the
-52-
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Graph 1
TOTAL PORTFOLIO GROWTH
Value Line = V.L.
Equally weighted = E.W.
Value weighted = V.W.
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equally weighted index. It represents a broad selection of
construction of the Value Line portfolio presented in this
paper. This point may be inconsequential however, since,
as mentioned earlier, the choice of a market index may be
independent of my Value Line portfolio construction.
It appears that smaller companies performed better
than the large capitalization companies for the survey
period. This fact helps explain the superiority of perfor-
mance of the equally weighted index.
In evaluating the growth of the Value Line portfolio,
one may notice that if one pursued the hypothetical but
impossible strategy of purchasing the recommended stocks
five days before receipt of the recommendations in the mail,
one would have realized growth of 5.8 times the initial
investment. This would be impossible for the casual inves-
tor. However, it is possible to keep track of current
earning reports, and be especially observant of falling
earnings -- leading to an early prediction of an upcoming
Value Line drop recommendation. It is more difficult to
predict a Value Line upcoming add recommendation. The
investor must scan the set of 300 stocks ranked 2 to search
for sharply increasing earnings which may signal an up-
grading in rank. Whereas the investor must only scan the
100 Group 1 securities in search of a drop recommendation.
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Furthermore, academicians may find this result fascinating,
since it is very likely after the date on which the Value
Line computer oriented mechanized stock valuation formula is
applied a trading date on which Value Line utilizes the
information to manage their supervisory funds.
To purchase stocks on the same day as receipt of
the publication is the first strategy that can easily be ad-
hered to. Following this strategy, the initial investment
would grow 4.8 times. These figures make no provision for
transaction costs, brokerage commission, or taxes which
would become due when following a trading strategy. Those
taxes would be deferred when following a buy and hold
strategy such as buying one of the indices. Even with these
negative factors, 4.8 times growth compared with 2.3 times
growth for the equally weighted portfolio has value as a
strategy and could absorb considerable expenses and conti-
nue to maintain its superiority.
Investment strategies simulating delays of 5, 10,
and 20 days before purchase or sale of the Value Line Rank
1 securities were tested. Growth was 3.2,. 2.9 times and 2.5
times respectively. Notice growth was perfectly inversely
ranked with trading delay. If one followed the
alternative of delaying a month before acting upon the
Value Line recommendation, the total portfolio growth of
2.5 times would be very close to the growth of the equally
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weighted portfolio of 2.4 times. Of course the active
trading strategy is subject to many expenses the buy and
hold strategy avoids.
Even waiting four weeks after the report publication,
the Value Line return does not drop below that of the best
of the market indices. In addition, it was observed, non
risk adjusted, that for all trading delays, in terms
of total growth, Value Line did better than the value
weighted portfolio and the Standard and Poor's "500" index.
During this same period, an investment in Treasury
Bills grew to 1.4 times the initial investment. Treasury
Bills are considered the risk free investment. The reader
should notice that the risk free investment outperformed
two of the market indices, doing better than the value
weighted combined New York and American Stock Exchange in-
dex, and the Standard and Poor's "500" index.
It is not wise to rely heavily on the unadjusted
growth figures without considering the regression results.
The Value Line portfolios are not as well diversified as
the market indices and not all of the portfolio movements
are described by the market. When stocks were purchased
2 2
on the Friday of publication, R terms were: R .85 for
regression on the equally weighted portfolios; R2=.79 for
regression on the value weighted portfolios; R =.73 for
regression on the Standard and Poor's "500". Correlation
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coefficients are:
Equally weighted portfolio .92
Value weighted portfolio .89
Standard and Poor's "500" .86
This demonstrates that most of the Value Line port-
folio movement is explained by market movement. It is this
divergence from returns predicted by market movements that
allows the portfolio to achieve superior performance.
If the Value Line portfolio is a riskier portfolio,
modern portfolio theory would lead us to expect extra return
to compensate for this risk. Modern portfolio theory states
that an investor should be rewarded only for the non-diver-
sifiable risk associated with the market. There should be
no benefit for holding company specific risk. One would
expect an extra reward to induce holding an undiversified
stock portfolio. In addition, if the Value Line portfolio
is riskier, (more volatile), than the market indexes, in
an up market, it would be expected to produce more growth.
This growth however would not be a measure of special pre-
dictive ability, but the result of holding a risky portfolio.
Of course, it is possible that there exists a mar-
ket timing element in the Value Line analysis which indi-
cates the proper periods in which to shift into high or
low beta portfolios. Naturally, Value Line should choose
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high beta portfolios when an up market is anticipated, and
low beta portfolios if a downturn is evident. If a down-
turn is evident, however, another strategy is to get out of
stocks completely, or invest in negative beta securities.
This question in regard to Value Line must be studied
elsewhere.
Table 5 also provides the answer of a valid question.
Suppose Value Line really does not have any ability to dis-
criminate. Suppose that the subscribers have been led to
believe that the Value Line analysts have predictive ability.
This may just be a rationalization for spending the approxi-
mately $3100.00 for the yearly Value Line subscription, or it
may be they like executing trades with their brokers, enjoy
receiving mail, reading the Value Line research, or are
non-value maximizers. If investors automatically followed
Value Line advice, the recommended stocks would rise in
price in the short run. However, if there was really no
information content in the Value Line report, one might
suspect that by the time one month elapsed, the fairly
efficient market would once again correctly price each
security . The growth figure for Value Line with the 20
day delay would be below that of the equally weighted port-
folio. Therefore, Value Line recommendations probably
contain some information not yet disseminated to the
efficient market before publication.
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Table 6 will allow us to quantify the Value Line
advantage. It summarizes the results of the 1971-1977
regressions, together with the important statistics, the
alpha, t-statistic for the alpha, the beta coefficients
calculated for each trading delay purchase of sale. All
of the R2 were high and the t-statistics of the betas were
very high (10 and above)).
The striking observation derived from Table 2 is the
perfect rank correlation of alphas for each of the market
indices. Notice all of the alphas are positive. In all
cases, they decrease with increased trading delay. The
alphas are adjusted to be meaningful yearly percentage
indicators.
I believe the most profound single figure of this
thesis is presented in Table 6. Taking market actionon the
Friday of publication, the Value Line portfolio, when regressed
against an equally weighted market index, (the best repre-
sentative proxy for the market), resulted in a positive
alpha of 12. significant with a t-statistic of 3.6 and a
beta of 1.04. This strongly suggests that Value Line
recommendations do produce investment strategies which
consistently outperform the market by over 10%. This
figure is large enough to absorb considerable transaction
expense.
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Graph 2
EXTRA RETURN 1971-1977 DATA VS. DELAY IN DAYS
Value Weighted = V.W.
Equally Weighted = E.W.
Standard and Poor's "500" = S&P
alpha
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Concentrating on the equally weighted portfolio,
the alphas were positive and statistically significant for
-5 days and 0 days delay, 15. (t-statistic 4.5) and 12.
(t-statistic 3.5) respectively. The time delay between
acting on the Value Line recommendation immediately and
waiting a week are the most noticeable in terms of extra
returns. After a week's delay the alpha is reduced to 4.5
(t-statistic 1.4) with a low t-statistic which does not
disprove the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence level.
For delays of 10 and 20 days the alphas were lower:
3.2 and 1.6, with low t-statistics of 1.0 and .49. The
beta of the regressions varied from 1.04 to .99, all ap-
proximately equal to the market beta of 1.0. Of course
all of the market indices do not have the same level of
risk. This would suggest that an equally weighted index,
accentuating the effect of smaller companies compared to a
value weighted index, stressing larger companies, would be
more volatile, since the smaller companies in general may
be riskier than the larger ones.
Both the value weighted and the Standard and Poor's
"500" index show the same rank ordering of alpha over the
entire study period. However, from Table 6, recorded
alphas are higher for 0 days delay; 22.2% (5.66) for
value weight and 26.2% (5.95) for the Standard and Poor's
"500". The Value Line portfolio regressed against these
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two market indices produced significant t-statistics, (over
2), for all trading day displacements.
In the same way as demonstrated earlier the t-
statistic declines as the trading delay increases.
Alpha decline Trading - 5 to 20 days
Equally weighted
Value weight
Standard & Poor's "500"
15. to 1.5
26. to 12.
30. to 16.
This table confirms that regardless of which market
index one prefers, there is a Value Line strategy that
produces large significantly positive alphas, ignoring
transaction costs and taxes.
Tables 7 through 11 provide yearly extra return
figures, t-statistic and betas.
Market Rundown
Equally
weighted
Up year 5.%
Down year -26.%
Down year -20.%
Up year - 58.%
Up year 49.%
mixed 17.%
Value
weighted
17.%
-17.%
-22.%
31.%
18.%
-2.%
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
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Table 7 summarizes results for -5 trading days for
the three market indices. All of the alphas are positive
ranging from 38.% to 1.7%. However, for many of the yearly
periods, the t-statistic does not demonstrate an alpha
appreciably different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
However the majority of our conclusion can be drawn from
the total period results. I would not look for significance
within the yearly figures.
Table 8 presents yearly data for 0 days market
action delay. This table shows two negative alphas. Both
are less than 1% yearly and they have very low t-statistics.
The equally weighted portfolio regression demonstrates
alphas of 23.% and 24.% for 1973 and 1974 with significant
t-statistics. The value weighted indices show significance
for 1974 through 1977 with yearly alphas in the 30% range.
Table 9 represents yearly data, observing a five
day delay before acting on Value Line recommendations. The
general level of t-statistics decreased with four negative
alpha observations. Otherwise, in general, alphas are
positive and large.
Table 10 summarizes results for a two week, (10
day), trading delay period. Once again there are four
negative observations of alphas. Although a t-statistic
of -1.6 on a two tailed test is not significant at the 95%
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Table 7
SUMMARY OF DATA FOR STOCK PURCHASE 5 DAYS
BEFORE VALUE LINE PUBLICATION
Equally Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 15. 4.5 1.0
1972 10. 1.7 .86
1973 24. 3.2 1.0
1974 28. 3.3 1.1
1975 12. .90 1.0
1976 4. .90 1.0
1977 7. .52 1.1
Value Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 26. 6.5 1.1
1972 1.6 .36 1.1
1973 1i. 1.1 1.2
1974 33. 2.3 .89
1975 31. 3.1 1.3
1976 22. 2.9 1.5
1977 39. 6.1 1.3
Standard and Poor's "500"
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 30. 6.4 1.1
1972 4.0 .77 1.1
1973 9.7 .82 1.2
1974 34. 2.2 .85
1975 37. 3.3 1.3
1976 32. 3.7 1.4
1977 47. 6.4 1.2
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Table 8
SUMMARY OF DATA FOR STOCK PURCHASE ON DAY OF
VALUE LINE RECEIPT
Equally Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 12. 3.6 1.0
1972 10. 1.7 .89
1973 23. 3.4 .99
1974 24. 2.8 1.1
1975 6. .48 1.1
1976 -0.92 -.10 1.1
1977 4.1 .92 1.5
Value Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 22. 5.7 1.1
1972 -0.34 -.74 1.1
1973 15. 1.3 1.2
1974 27. 2.1 .88
1975 28. 2.7 1.3
1976 21. 2.6 1.5
1977 31. 5.4 1.3
Standard and Poor's "500"
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 26. 5.9 1.1
1972 1.4 .28 1.0
1973 14. 1.1 1.2
1974 28. 1.9 .84
1975 35. 3.0 1.3
1976 31. 3.5 1.4
1977 40. 5.9 1.2
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Table 9
SUMMARY OF DATA FOR STOCK PURCHASE FIVE DAYS AFTER
RECEIPT OF VALUE LINE RECOMMENDATION
Equally Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 4.6 1.4 1.0
1972 7.5 1.6 .99
1973 16. 2.3 .97
1974 12. 1.3 .96
1975 -6.7 -.56 1.1
1976 -10. -1.3 1.1
1977 2.7 .61 1.5
Value Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 15. 3.8 1.1
1972 -4.9 -1.1 1.1
1973 15. 1.1 1.1
1974 19. 1.5 .89
1975 14. 1.4 1.3
1976 12. 1.6 1.5
1977 24. 4.3 1.4
Standard and Poor's "500"
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 19. 4.3 1.0
1972 -3. -.68 1.0
1973 14. .92 1.1
1974 21. 1.5 .86
1975 20. 1.8 1.2
1976 22. 2.5 1.4
1977 33. 4.9 1.3
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Table 10
SUMMARY OF DATA FOR PURCHASE OF STOCK TEN DAYS AFTER
RECEIPT OF VALUE LINE RECOMMENDATION
Equally Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 3.3 1.0 1.0
1972 7.8 1.7 1.0
1973 16. 2.5 .97
1974 6.9 .75 .94
1975 7.1 .63 1.1
1976 -12. 1.6 1.1
1977 -3.4 .71 1.5
Value Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 13. 3.3 1.1
1972 -6.1 -1.3 1.1
1973 15. 1.0 1.1
1974 19. 1.5 .89
1975 12. 1.2 1.3
1976 11. 1.4 1.4
1977 21. 3.6 1.4
Standard and Poor's "500"
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 18. 3.9 1.0
1972 -5.0 -.97 1.0
1973 14. .84 1.0
1974 20. 1.5 .86
1975 18. 1.5 1.2
1976 20. 2.3 1.3
1977 30. 4.4 1.3
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Table 11
SUMMARY OF DATA FOR PURCHASE OF STOCK TWENTY DAYS AFTER
RECEIPT OF VALUE LINE RECOMMENDATION
Equally Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 1.6 .49 .99
1972 5.8 1.3 1.0
1973 17. 2.6 .96
1974 2.3 .24 .92
1975 -11. -1.1 1.2
1976 -11. -1.4 1.1
1977 5.2 1.1 1.5
Value Weighted Portfolio
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 12. 3.1 1.1
1972 -12. -2.8 1.1
1973 20. 1.4 1.1
1974 16. 1.3 .92
1975 10. 1.1 1.3
1976 10. 1.4 1.4
1977 18. 3.5 1.4
Standard and Poor's "500"
Year Alpha% t-statistic Beta
1971-1977 16. 3.6 1.0
1972 -12. -2.5 1.1
1973 21. 1.3 1.1
1974 18. 1.4 .89
1975 16. 1.8 1.2
1976 19. 2.2 1.3
1977 27. 4.2 1.3
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confidence level, the probability of achieving it by chance
alone is still quite small. This is the t-statistic for a
-12.% alpha in 1976 regressed against the equally weighted
portfolio. Otherwise the results seen are similar to the
5 day delay.
Table 11 simulates a strategy of delays four weeks
before action on Value Line advice. There are four negative
alpha figures and two significant with t-statistics less
than -2. The positive alphas are generally lower than the
other delays, nevertheless they are primarily in the 10 and
20 percent range. It is shown that over the entire test
period, results were significantly lower when there is delay
in following the Value Line recommendations. However, even
after four weeks delay, this table demonstrates that
Value Line would prove useful in certain periods, although
there were also significant negative alphas for the one
month delay.
The issue of the extent to which Value Line pro-
jects, and practices market timing remains unresolved.
The methodology did not provide discriminate information
for beta movement analysis. Although the tables demon-
strate that betas vary yearly, there is no strong support
for the intent of this variance.
Table 12 supplies total period and yearly sub-
divided one month Treasury Bill returns. Notice interest
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Table 12
TREASURY BILL RETURNS
1971-1977
Total Period Return 40.
Yearly Returns
1972 3.73%
1973 6.43%
1974 7.69%
1975 5.78%
1976 5.10%
1977 4.89%
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rates were highest in 1974 ranking at 7.7% and lowest in
1977 at 3.7%.
Table 13 presents yearly cumulative growth of
market returns, Treasury Bills and the Value Line portfolio.
The choice of investment which would have produced the best
results, at year end, independent of risk, may be deter-
mined in this table.
From November 1971 to the end of 1972, an investor
would have done best if he had invested in a value weighted
market portfolio, although the difference between any of
the market alternatives were within a few percentage points.
To the end of 1973, the Value Line strategy would have
been the best decision with growth of 1.18 times the initial
investment. By the end of 1974, because of a dramatic
market decline, one would have done best by having initially
invested in the risk free asset, Treasury Bills. Of course
Treasury Bill returns may have been higher if longer
maturities were purchased. For 1975, 1976, and 1977, it
appears that the initial investment in Value Line would
have been the best investment, demonstrating growth to
2.2 times, 3.6 times, and 4.7 times.
Table 14 presents market yearly growth. Volitali-
ty, can be observed, as well as the mixed returns of 1977,
"zero" days, trading delay with the equally weighted index
down 1.7%, Value Line up 29%, but the value weighted index
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Graph 3
CUMULATIVE PORTFOLIO GROWTH
Treasury Bill = T.B.
Value Line = V.L.
Equally weighted = E.W.
Value Weighted = V.W.
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Table 14
YEARLY GROWTH PORTFOLIO
(-5 Days)
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
( 0 Days)
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Equally
Weighted
3.0%
-34.%
-27.%
66.%
56.%
16.%
Equally
Weighted
5.3%
-25.%
-20.%
58.%
49.%
17.%
Value
Weighted
14.%
-20.%
-31.%
31.%
26.%
-3.6%
Value
Weighted
17.%
-17. %
-22.%
31. %
18.%
-1.7%
Standard &
Poor's "500"
12.%
-20. %
-33.%
27.%
18.%
-11.%
Standard &
Poor's "500"
16.%
-17.%
.24%
27.%
11.%
-8.5%
( 5 Days)
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
(10 Days)
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Equally
Weighted
3.3%
-26.%
-16. %
62.%
43.%
17.%
Equally
Weighted
0.24%
-20. %
-12. %
66.%
39.%
17.%
Value
Weighted
16.%
-21.%
-24. %
35.%
15.%
-0.78%
Value
Weighted
15.%
-15. %
-23.%
38.%
12.%
0.19%
Standard &
Poor's "500"
15.%
-22.%
-27.%
31.%
7.8%
-7.5%
Standard &
Poor's "500"
15.%
-16.%
-26. %
34.%
5.0%
-6.3%
Value
Line
17.%
-16. %
-5.1%
90.%
71.%
34.%
Value
Line
17.%
-8.1%
1.0%
79.%
54.%
29.%
Value
Line
11.%
-12. %
-5.%
63.%
34.%
20.%
Value
Line
8.0%
4.0%
-5.6%
63.%
25.%
19.%
-76-
Table 14 (cont'd.)
YEARLY GROWTH PORTFOLIO
(20 Days)
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Equally
Weighted
-9.1%
-15.%
-3.%
59. %
29.%
18.%
Value
Weighted
7.7%
-14.%
-16.%
32.%
8.0%
1.1%
Standard &
Poor's "500"
8.3%
-16.%
-18.%
27.%
1.4%
-5.1%
Value
Line
-3.%
1.6%
-0.08%
55.%
20.%
19.%
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down 1.7% and the Standard and Poor's "500" down 8.5%.
The empirical data presented in these tables
provide strong support for the verification of Value Line
Investment Survey as a useful investment advisory service.
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Chapter 6
TAXATION AND TRADING STRATEGY
Taxation is an important determinant in the investor's
behavior. This section is intended to be thought-provoking,
however it is not a comprehensive dissertation on tax manage-
ment in investment strategy.
People often talk about taxes, they usually complain
about paying taxes which are too high. Frequently, they look
for a way to minimize their tax liability; however, they
continue to make investment decisions with little regard to
the future tax consequences.
In my classes at Sloan there are many instances
where I have been part of purely theoretical decisions where
taxes and transaction costs are ignored. I have also wit-
nessed taxation discussions which ignore the advanced manage-
ment techniques necessary to do sophisticated financial
planning. As C. P. Snow would say, I hope to bridge the gap
between these two extremes and provide an investment frame-
work which considers with a careful methodology the conse-
quences due to taxation.
Textbooks seem to skim over the issue of personal
taxation, yet they describe elaborate methods to maximize
financial decisions. There are also books describing almost
every one of the myriad of taxation issues -- yet no one
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speaks of maximizing decisions after taxes. I admit my
methods may show rough edges, but my goal is to examine tax
strategies to maximize return after taxes.
I assume that an individual's primary goal is to
maximize his economic welfare when involved in an investment
strategy. This maximization to be realized must be net of
taxes. My purpose is to develop a simple model example of
taxation which takes explicit account of the individual's
liabilities both for ordinary income and capital gains taxes.
I hope to identify a set of guides and logical investment
decisions.
This section will compare two stock trading strate-
gies with the goal of maximizing profit while minimizing
taxes. This is a study of a complex issue with a myriad of
possible solutions. If I omit analysis of a situation it is
usually because the analysis would be self cancelling -- I
plan to attack those areas which will express differential
results. My method will employ a scenario of "what ifs" and
apply this guideline to the strategies I study.
I plan to discuss the following propositions:
-- What is the Value Line trading strategy, and what
are the tax consequences of the strategy to the
individual investor?
-- How does a similar analysis of the Standard and
Poor's "500" stock index hold up?
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-- How are the returns distributed between dividends
and capital gains?
How do taxes impact upon market gain which is real
gain, and extra gain due to the ability to pick
stock by active trading?
Does the government, by taxing gains and subsi-
dizing losses, reduce risk to the individual
investor?
How to manage taxes to minimize them.
Look at preliminary data.
-- Ignore the approximately <1% stock transfer taxes.
When Value Line publishes a return for securities
in a portfolio, they ignore brokerage costs, dividends,
stock transfer taxes and all consequences of income taxes.
The Group 1 portfolio I will be discussing for the remainder
of this chapter will be an equally value weighted portfolio of
only New York Stock Exchange Rank 1 securities. Weekly the
portfolio will be updated and theoretically rebalanced to
maintain equal weighting.
What tax issues relate to these tax trading strate-
gies? The major point of interest is the differential
treatment of long-term capital gains and ordinary income.
Congress has extended special advantageous tax treatment to
capital gains. The House Ways and Means Committee has
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recently passed an amendment to reduce the capital gain tax
to provide greater incentives to invest in growing companies.
The May 8, 1978, Wall Street Journal included "the reduction
in the maximum rate on capital gains taxes from the current
level of 49.125% to 25% in 1980 would have a positive effect
on economic growth while reducing the federal budget deficit."
What was the law in 1977 regarding the taxation of
capital gains? It was that one half of a long-term capital
gain is included in an individual's income tax base, pro-
viding for an effective tax rate from 7% to 35%, according
to a government publication, the President's 1978 Tax Program.
There is a special rule which provides that 50,000 of these
gains each year are not to be taxed at over the 25% rate.2
How do the capital gains rules affect our portfolio
decisions? Our first realization is that we receive income
from both capital gains and dividends. Dividends are re-
ceived while the stock is held in the portfolio and are
taxed at ordinary income. Capital gains are taxed at a
lower rate if the stock was held long enough to qualify as a
long-term gain.
The individual's portfolio should be managed to take
advantage of long-term capital gains. This is a divergence
:from just following Value Line recommendations. In 1977,
the gain or loss from the sale of stock held for more than
nine months was long-term. In earlier years the cutoff was
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six months, and this year and in the future it is 12 months.
Net short-term gains, or the excess of net short-
term gains; over net long-term loss is taxable as ordinary
income, according to a November 4, 1977, note in Value Line.
Taxation of long-term gains is explained above, however, the
untaxed half of the gain is treated as preference income and
may be subject to minimum tax. If tax preference for the
year exceeds one half of the individual's regular income or
$10,000, whichever is greater, the excess is taxed at 15%.
Net short-term capital loss, or the excess of loss
over net long-term capital gain are deductible from ordinary
income starting in 1978 of $3,000 per year with the excess
carried forward as a short-term loss carrover to future years.
Further, one half any net long-term capital loss is deductible
from ordinary income.
The portfolio may not commit a wash sale, that is,
a loss not allowed for tax purposes, if the same security is
sold and bought back within 30 days. This dictates that if
you want to take a loss you must double up on the security
you want to remain in the portfolio.
A possible strategy for an investor to gain tax
advantages while trading under the Value Line strategy
would be for the individual to realize losses to offset
gains before the end of the tax year. Then these stocks
could be brought back into the portfolio if they were still
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rated Group 1.
This sounds simple, yet taxes are being deferred.
When the government taxes gains and allows loss deduction it
is essentially reducing the risk of any investment you make.
Because of this risk reduction, individuals may be willing to
hold more volatile portfolios than would otherwise be the
case.
]n "The Implications of the Capital Gains Tax for
Investment Decisions," 3 by Holt and Shelton, the being locked
into an investment by the capital gains tax is discussed.
The article was written in 1961, and recently the law has been
changed; the capital gains tax can no longer be escaped by
dying before selling. The new law values trading gains
against the stock price as of December 1, 1976.
They ask how much extra yield is necessary in an
alternative investment to overcome the disadvantage of in-
curring the capital gains tax. In this study capital gains
tax cannot be avoided, only deferred. As long as it can be
deferred it representes a free loan from the government.
When following Value Line's recommendation to sell a stock
and replace it with a new one the following question should
be asked. Are the future dividends and capital gains on
this new choice sufficient to overcome the amount lost in
capital gains taxes? The article concludes that this yield
differential is smaller than most investors realize -- often
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on the order of 1%. So capital gains taxation may not be a
major implication while following the Value Line system,
although as we will shortly see, much of the Value Line port-
folio does not qualify for long-term capital gains treatment,
due to the high portfolio turnover ratio.
My next step is to examine the actual Value Line
portfolios. The specifics are chosen from available data,
which is really not in the proper form for this analysis, so
many assumptions will have to be tolerated. I studied the
most recent 21 weeks of data -- conclusions were drawn from
the period of August 5, 1977 to December 30, 1977. At times
comparisons may seem out of time frame -- and still, within
a broad tolerable range this analysis is still useful in an
educational and thought-provoking process.
Black's study "Yes Virginia, There is Hope; Tests
the Value Line Ranking System,"4 ignored tax consequences.
Black revised portfolios on a monthly basis, while I am
employing weekly updating, which might account for the
higher turnover observed, or we may now be in a more volatile
market (Figure 15). In Black's study extra return was
measured at 10% per year with a "T" value of 4.0 a significant
result. Diversification with the market showed a correlation
coefficient of about .95.
Excluding transaction costs and taxes, Black's
results may seem unrealistic for the investor, especially
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Table 15
APPROXIMATE COMPOSITION OF VALUE LINE PORTFOLIO
Rank 1
22% of stocks qualify for long-term capital gains
78% short-term capital gains
Average price of stock 25.54
Average dividend 1.11 or 4.35%
Turnover Rate According to Black study 130%-88%
According to new data 225%-140%
Black found about 10% excess returns on Rank 1
7% excess returns on Rank 1-3 Hold
Our data is from December 31, 1976; August 5, 1977; and
December 30, 1977 Value Line
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because of the 130% turnover ratio in the Rank 1 Group. This
high turnover leads one to believe that the majority of the
individual securities are held for less than one year, the
length of time necessary to qualify for long-term capital
gains. In my new study, it was found that turnover was closer
to 225% creating large transaction costs. This is without
the extra trading which would be necessary to maintain an exactly
equally weighted portfolio which is an assumption which I will
now relax. Turnover also increases because of the large
number of rank changes when quarterly reports are issued.
Methods may be employed to reduce transaction fre-
quency. These include selling a stock only after it falls to
a Rank III, as suggested by Black. This would also tend to
increase the probability that a stock will qualify for long-
term capital gain treatment. Using this strategy, Black's
volatility of turnover was reduced to 88%. According to my
translation analysis I would predict a 140% turnover. Under
this newly defined strategy extra return was also reduced to
7% with less trading, as reported by Black.
Now let us take a broad look at the application of
the rules of taxation to the Value Line strategy between
December 31, 1976 and December 30, 1977. 22% of the stocks
ranked 1 remained in the portfolio, and therefore qualified
for long-term capital gains treatment. Therefore, approxi-
:mately 175 stocks were traded in and out of the portfolio
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during the year -- all representing short-term gains.
As a statistic portfolio for snalysis I chose August 5
1977. 78 of the 100 stocks in this portfolio are traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. The average price of a stock in
this portfolio was $25.54. The average dividend was $1.11 or
about 4.35% of the price of the stock represented yield on an
annual basis.
According to Value Line the average percentage change
in price between December 29, 1976 and June 29, 1977, for
Group 1 stocks with weekly updates was a positive 15.4%. Ap-
proximately 13% of this gain is from stock appreciation and
about 2.4% from dividend income. I also attribute about 22%
of the capital gain to long-term capital gains under the one
year holding period rule by extrapolating the assumptions
made above. On an annual basis the gain distributes as
follows:
Assumption #1 Long-Term Capital Gain 6.%
Value Line Rank 1 Short-Term Capital Gain 20.4%
Weekly Trading Dividend-Ordinary Income 4.4%
Total Annual Return 30.8%
This result is due largely to a very good time pe-
riod for the market. Most of the gain is taxed as ordinary
income. Would it be advantageous to try to hold stocks
longer to take advantage of the favorable long-term capital
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gains ratle? This would reduce transaction costs conceivably.
What would the situation look like if we viewed the same
portfolio and time frame as under Assumption I, with one
change, the restriction that only one portfolio change is
allowed halfway through the time period at the six-month
point. In this case the six-month gain was reduced from 15.4%
to 10.1% according to Value Line. My estimate of the turn-
over ratio under this assumption is about 50%. This is only
a ball park figure and verification requires data collection
of stock tracking them from Rank 1 all the way until they
enter Rank III. This is beyond the scope of this thesis, so
my 50% figure must suffice as an estimate. Under these
conditions Assumption II is created:
Assumption II Long-Term Capital Gain 7.9%
One Trade Only Short-Term Capital Gain 7.9%
Rank 1-3 Value Dividend Income 4.4%
Line
Total Annual Return 20.2%
Further insights may be provided by actually taking
a dollar position in each of these portfolios. A hundred
share of this portfolio as is on August 5, 1978, would cost
$2,554 in December 1977. (There are brokerage costs of
about 3% and stock transfer taxes which I have not included.
Also, the portfolios may not be valued exactly -- but the
approximation is sufficient.) How do tax consequences vary
under Assumptions I and II?
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Before attempting an illustration I must restate
the simplicity of this analysis and point out it is only for
illustrative purposes of possible tax consequences. It is
unusual to examine a period of such high return, which do
provide us with capital gains and not losses, after all I
have not studied securities individually. Another simplifi-
cation of this analysis which may seriously bias results is
the lack of a measure of capital losses. This is an important
fault because the losses could be directly subtracted from
gains for tax purposes.
Assumptions must be made about our hypothetical
portfolio holder. They are as follows: 50% income tax
bracket, with less than $50,000 in capital gains so that
capital gains are taxed at 25%. Another assumption of the
portfolio size of $11,500 provides for dividend payments of
approximately $500. which, taxed at 50% as ordinary income
before the $100. dividend exclusion, creates an effective
tax rate of 40% on dividends.
The net gain after taxes on Assumption I was
$1,989.50 or a rate of return of 17% compared to a $1,435.00
gain under Assumption II representing a 12% after tax return.
So, at first glance it appears that it was not worthwhile to
reduce portfolio turnover to seek capital gains preference
tax rates. However, this is not necessarily the case. The
increased trading costs associated with Assumption I could
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easily consume the 5% differential and make the two assumptions
finish in a dead heat.
There is still another comparison I would like to
make before concluding this glimpse into taxation study.
That is a comparison of Rank 1 Value Line stocks from 1970-
1976 to the Standard and Poor's "500" composite index for
the same time period.
The Standard and Poor's "500" stock index contains
no trades, and therefore no trading costs for the entire
period. Essentially, I am comparing a buy and hold strategy
to active portfolio management. Again, unfortunately there
is a major drawback to this analysis, and that is that I do
not use a valid risk adjustment factor for Value Line, which
may tend to overstate its returns.
Results for Standard and Poor's "500" show only a
27% after tax return from 1970-1977 (July). Using the same
hypothetical $11,500. investment and applying a 40% tax on
dividends and a 25% capital gains tax, (actually I have
omitted to account for the time value of dividend payments
made seven years ago), however, since I am ignoring this
dividend reinvestment for both Standard and Poor's "500" and
Value Line, I believe the bias will remain small.
The total return for the entire period is 27% after
tax for the Standard and Poor's "500" and 114% for Value Line's
data. However, this comparison does not take account of the
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transaction costs of the 13-225% turnover of the Value Line
portfolio. To simulate this, I will recompute the Value
Line returns reducing each yearly yield by 5% to account for
the transfer tax and brokerage costs of such heavy trading.
After the recalculation of Value Line results,
reducing the yearly returns by 5% yearly, the pretax profit
is reduced to $7,880. which, after taxes, reduces to the
following:
Long-Term Capital Gains (22%) 1733.60x25%= 433.40
Short-Term Gain 6146.40x50%=3073.20
Dividends 5136.11x40%=2054.44
Total Tax 5561.04
Total Gain $7455.07
After Tax Gain 65%
I believe this to be a more realistic figure for the real
Value Line return, which is still about two and a half times
greater than the Standard and Poor's "500".
In conclusion, I have presented two views of after
tax returns following the Value Line system. In each case
the gain in return due to capital gains treatment was
balanced against a lower excess return, or index, involved
with the one year holding period. In all cases, the
probability of error in analysis in this taxation section
is high, due to high portfolio turnover, transaction costs,
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offsetting gains and losses, and the capital gains holding
period. When a more suitable data base is complete for
taxation analysis, a complete story can be devised with more
precision, less restrictions, and fewer assumptions. This is
an area which is ripe for further study.
In the last few weeks the 1978 tax law revisions
have already altered the analysis applied to the 1977 strategy
presented here. Essentially stock investors have gained.
The new Law liberalizes the rules regarding capital gain.
"The maximum rate falls from 49% to 28% once you pay taxes
on 40% instead of 50% of long-term gains. ...15% minimum tax
no longer applies to the untaxed part of capital gain."
This is a major challenge to investors since the
rules have been so dramatically changed. In a nutshell --
there is less of a deterrent to selling stocks which show
capital gains. However, the holding period for capital gains
is now 12 months. 6
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Evaluation of investment performance is often
considered an after-the-fact measure. However, it should
be part of an on-going improvement process in state of the
art finance theory. Investors who pay the costs associated
with active portfolio management deserve to have a true
performance measure.
At times it may be difficult to separate performance
due to skill from that due to luck. The importance of these
findings rest on Value Line's expost alpha values, i.e., the
vertical intercept obtained when an expost characteristic
line is fitted using excess returns in an ordinary least
square regression. Value Line's expost alpha should be in-
terpreted as the average difference between its return and
that of a passive buy and hold market strategy of equal risk.
This thesis has examined Value Line's historic alpha
values. What does this imply about the future? The signifi-
cantly high t-statistics demonstrated by Value Line data over
many consecutive years demonstrates consistently superior
performance which can be projected into the future.
The objective of an actively managed portfolio of
common stocks is to choose securities so that a greater
return results than that produced by an index fund or a naive
investment strategy. The actively managed portfolio must
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overcome additional costs not incurred in a passive portfolio
strategy. These include the cost of gathering and analyzing
information, transaction costs of executing trades, non-
optimal taxation decisions, and non-efficient portfolio
diversification.
This study analyzes the 100 stocks Value Line ranks
"1" for year ahead appreciation. Transaction delays are com-
puted for -5, 0, 5, 10 and 20 days. Value Line's four main
criteria of security evaluation are: non-parametric value
position, magnitude of over or underevaluation, earnings
momentum and an earnings surprise factor.
In previous Value Line research, Shelton1 found
investors displayed superior performance than efficient
market theory would suggest. Hausman2 points out flaws in
Shelton's statistical tests and recommends additional study.
Murphy3 essentially agrees with Shelton, discovering signi-
ficant results consistant with the random walk. Conversely
Kaplan and Weil's 4 results support the efficient market
hypothesis. They believe that the Value Line rankings are
flawed and that most performance variation is due to stock
risk differentials. Black's5 study concluded that even with
the imposition of transaction costs,-Value Line continues to
give significant positive results over a five year period.
Fama6 provides strong support for efficient markets
in his study of the 30 Dow Jones industrial stocks from
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1957 to 1967. Sharpe,7 studying 34 mutual funds and Jensen,8
studying the performance of 115 mutual funds each lend support
to the view that capital markets are efficient.
This Value Line data was hand collected covering
the period from November 5, 1971 to December 30, 1977.
Computer programs were written to: 1) generate weekly port-
folios; 2) name and verify portfolios; 3) compute indivi-
dual portfolio and market returns for certain trading day
delays; 4) calculate Treasury Bill returns; and, 5) cal-
culate ordinary least square regressions.
Market indices studied included an equally weighted
and value weighted New York and American Stock Exchange
Index, as well as the Standard and Poor's "500" composite.
In the regression analysis the Value Line excess
return was the dependent variable and the market index excess
return was the independent variable.
Ignoring transaction costs, the Value Line portfolio
would have grown to 5.8, 4.8 and 3.1 times the initial invest-
ment for trading delays of -5, 0, and 5 days respectively.
Each of these is superior to the best of the market indices,
the equally weighted index which grew 2.3 times. A similar
investment in Treasury Bills would have grown 1.4 times. R2
terms were all high.
Executing market action on the Friday of publication
the Value Line portfolio when regressed on the equally
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weighted portfolio resulted in a positive alpha of about 12%
with a t-statistic of 3.6. This result strongly refutes
efficient market arguments and suggests that Value Line
recommendations do produce investment strategies which con-
sistently outperform the market. This figure is large enough
to absorb considerable transaction expense.
Assuming an individual's investment goal is to maxi-
mize final economic wealth, consideration must be made for
taxes and transaction costs. This requires balancing extra
return against capital gains holding periods, and reduction
of the agressive Value Line trading turnover rate. The rec',._"
major tax revisions provide new opportunities for further
investigation.
Many unanswered questions remain. Is Value Line
analysis biased towards low price/earning multiple stocks,
or do they favor smaller, inefficiently priced companies?
To what extent do they rely on security analysis, or on
adjusted beta and market timing? Further work would also
be valuable in studying the optimal investment tradeoff
between superior returns and transaction frequency.
-97-
Appendix I
CUMULATIVE COMPANY LIST
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FILE: C-L"'UL L I TA P CNV S T I' L ONiITOR q? SYT EN
1 .= 1 71 
2 = 2)241 
3 = 235 31C
4 = 2 8 J1 -
5 = 1 1 
6 = 7L5 :10
7 = 745-51C9= 77,8; '
9 = 814 .1 
10 = 867710
11 = 92661C
12 = 9z2921C
13 = 1028410
14 = 116t01C
15 = 117341C
16 = 131 3410C
17 = 13788F31
13 = 1 3961 
19 = 147521C
20 = 1717, 1 
21 = 173721C
122 = 1 763413
_23 = 1908 710 
24 = la2 '51
25 = 194111S
26 = 1 53 7 10
27 = 1 3451C
23 = 227711C
'29 = 227711u
30 = 231411 
31 = 235 1 13
32 = 235511C
33 = 237531C
34 = 2377110
35 = 239D41C
3 6 = 2 40'6 q 1
37 = 2473 51C
-3 = 247531C
39 = 251051C
40 = 252311 C
41 = 2532110
42 = 2553710
4 3 = 2 58161
4i = 250731
45 = 2535 71C
46 = 265731 0
4.7 = 266811C
4.P = 268I7 q IC
49 = -' 733 2C
50) = 27421 9
51 = 274471C
52 = 2762 71 
53 = 2926710 C
54 = 2946510
55 = 2960 1 '
A J I>NOS I IC
AD S I T
,% T n Iq
ADAVS EXPRESS CO
D 4I RAL TCP
TDV'"NCE INVS CORP
AE OJET EX ' C P
AETN'A LIFE . CAS CO
AHM NSCN H F 5 CO
AT IRORNE F HT CORP
AIRCO INC
ALAAMA AS CORP
ALAN OOD STL O0
ALA .A I NTST CO
ALRCRTSONS TIIC
ALCC STD CORP
L-ALCN LaPS I JC
ALFXAND E S INC
L L -3HA4 Y CRP
-ALLrGHENY LUDLUM IND
ALL-N4 SR CUD INC
ALL IED CHE M CORP
ALL IED LS INC
ALL !ED PROCS CORP DE
ALLIED SUPERMARKETS
A L LIS CHALME RS O RP
ALPHA -PORTLAND IN
AMALGAMATEC SUGAR
AMBAC INES INC
AMEDACE CrRP
AMERADA HESS CORP
A'E.9ICAN AIR FILT
IMERICA^N AIRL IN
A1C CR D I NC
A M _ I CAN
AME' ICA-I
A T ' I C A N
AM ER ICAN
A1ME I C A N
AM ER ICAN
AMER ICAN
A ME CT A 4NA;M  I CAN
AM E I CA N
41 , , C A NAMER ICAN
A ME I I C ANA.r: I CAN
! ME? ICAN
At~EC I CAA
AMER ICA I
AME2 .I ANq
Cumulative company list.
DS
C
ER
C
BAKERIES C
BRO.DCASTIN
BLC G A INTE
CHAIN CAB
CfONSUMER IN
CYANAMID CO
ELEC PWR IN
EXPRESS CO
FAMILY CORP
GEN INS CO
HCI ST DE R
HCSP SUPPLY
IlNVT CO
M'AIZE PRODS
E:- INTL IJ
ECIORP IN
M TRS COR P
RESH r EV-
SE.ATING CO
StHIP BLDG C
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FILE: CUL"liUL LISTm!R A 9CCOIVERS ATI L CNIT3R SY'
56 = 2q7171710 A= 7,=EICA'"I1 ST" IrC
57 = 3 -8710 = AMEICA I STERILIZE .
58 = 30 1 -951C = A E9IC AN - S TOE C
59 = 3 071 01 = A1EcC, I Co
1( 60 = 3114110 = - FCC INC
61 = 323 71r = AMPCO PITTSnUr" 'ORP
62 = 321721- = AMSTAR CORP
3 = 321771C = AMSTED I7NDS INC
64 3233910 = 3  = MTL I NC
65 = 336091C = ANDERSON CLAYTON C
C;' 66 = 3531301 = ANKEN INCS
67 = 37411 1 C = APACHE CORP
68 = 3751910 = APCC OIL CRP
C 69 = 3752 1C = PECO CORP
70 = 393751C = ARCATA ATL CORP
71 = 3:94831C = ARCR DANIELS MIDLA
C- 72 = 4'055510 = ARIZ7CN oPU SV CO
73 = 4208312 = RrMA)A CP
74 = 4219510 = ARMCO STL CRP
75 = 4232110 = CRUMSTRONG ORK CO
76 = 4246510 = Ar"-STRON0 RUBR CO
77 = 4333 91 = ARV N I i ¢S I NC
C. 78 = 445401C = ASHLAND CIL INC
79 = 4748310 = ATHLONE INDS INC
80 = 492673 = ATLAS CORP
81 = 5251 10 = -^USTRAL CIL INCJ
82 = 330151C = AUTO"ATIC DATA PROCE
83 = 5321310 = AUTCVATICN IDS INC
34 = 535011 r = AVCC CORP
5 = 536271C = AVERY ITL CORD
86 = 538071C = AVNET INC
K1 87 = 5499710 = AZTrC OIL GAS CO
88 5f147 = 171C ACCCK WILCOX CO
89 = 5635710 = BACFE GRCUP INC
K'.j 90 = 5725510 = bAKER IDS INC
91 = 6C2211C = BJANGOR PUNTA CORP
92 = 671491C = ARRBER OIL CORD
C. 393 = 98'R6911 = BASIC I 1
94 = 705911 = BATES MFG INC
95 = 71.7071C = BAUSCH LCVB INC
C 96 = 71.8921- = BAXTER TRAVENOL LABS
7 = 73;23910 = BAYUK CIGARS INC
98 = 7588710 = BECTON DICKINSON 
0' 99 = 766351 = BEECH IRCRAFT CORP
1C0 = 77i'41910 = 3ELCO PETE CORP
101) = 7745510 = BELDEN CORP
102 = 77'4110 = ?ELDING HEMINWAY INC
103 = 778511 = PELL HCWELL CO
104 = 814371C = GEMIS INC
C,, 105 = ~44191) 24491C = RKEY PHCOT INC
106 = 8f6, 5511 = °EST PR OS INC
107 = 875091C = ,ETH-LEHE!' STL CORP
O~ 10- : 92510 = RL~I JOHN C
109 = 935451 C = ,LI S ' LAUGHLIN I C
110 = 936711C = BL3CK H R INC
FTLE: CULMUL
C
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LISTPR A .:' V=RSATIONY^L 'CNITOR S,
= 5293 l*
-= 6 7 7 9 1 
= 7C0231 
= 973831C
= 9 5451
= 1020 9710
= 1054251C
= 190C431
= 1 10' 971 C
11 5 3 3 11 
= 11563720
= 1170431C
= 11742110
= 11883510
= 11?00710
15291C
= 1206553C
= 12237510
= 12316 91
= 12l 841,
= 1256151C
= 125011C
= 12705510
= 1276951
- 12P7931C
13021 7 1 
- 13106910
- 13441110
= 1344291C
= 13 644 93 
= 139'86110
= 14233910
= 14414 1 1 C
= 14423851
= 14446510 
= L445011C
= 1462851C
= 14E42910
= 1491231C
= I233 1C
- 1 530:9  
= 15C431C
= 1513031C
= 1523121C
= 1 536091C
= 153 971 C
= 1551771C
= 1 554471 
=- 56,4n210
= 156 82510
= 1568791C
= 1 5 : 50 1 0
= 15852513
= 16278910
= 16326 71
= 163603 1-
OLU- ELL INC
?On TE BRCOKS INC
O0I OE CASCACE CO'P
3K UNTtH CLUJ INC
BOURNS INC
?RAiIFF INTL CORP
_nICS STPATTON CO
ORI STOL 'YERS CO
BROWN CO
3RO,N FORMAN DISTILL
RRUNSWICK CORP
BRUSH WELLMAN INC
BUD CO
3UDCf-ET INDS INC
OUFFALO FC7GE CO
BUNK<ER RAMC CORP
3URNS INTL SEC SVCS
'USH UNVL INC
C I CORP
L C AMER INC
C T S CORP
CAB T CORP
CAESARS WCRLD INC
CA LDOR INC
CAL IFCRIN IA FINL CORP
CALLAHAN MNG CORP
CA"PBELL RED LAKE M I
CrAMPBELL SOU ° CO
CAN4ADIAN PAC LTD
CAPITAL CITIES COMMU
CARLISLE CORP
CAROLINA PWR & LT CO
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY
CARRIER CCRP
CARIERS £ GEN CORP
CARTER WALLACE 1",C
CASTLE F COOKE INC
CATERPILLAR TRACTOR
CECO CORP
CELANESE CCRP
CENCO INC
C EN TEX CORP
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS &
CENTRAL LA ELEC INC
CENTRAL SOYA INC
CE N TRAL TEL £ UTILS
CENTRNICS CATA CCMP
CERRO CORP
CE-RTAI TECC CORP
CHA'OION HO'E BLORS
CH 'P IOl INTL CORP
CHECKER VTRS CORP
CHELSEA INCS I*IC
CHE v"TRON "CRP
C
C
C
C
C/
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
1 1Q
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
129
129
13C
131
132
133
134
135
137
139
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
153
15 1
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
161
162
163
164
165
C
C
C
C
C©
C,
C,
t .,
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1651591
1 7 2 6 31 
17113o ) 1
17111 IhC
1715831=
172 17 =
1778461
1 814861 =
1 94861C =
18937313 =
19055610 =
19325210 =
19337310 =
143551C =
19484610 =
19501 810 =
1958461C =
19686410 =
1982791C =
20010113 =
2002911C =
2023811: =
22065110 =
20320113 =
2034171C =
2-D490 D13 =
23536313 =
20681313 =
20719212 -
2)92911C =
2092371C =
21079510 =
21129 1 =
2113271 =
211 4851r
21168710 =
2120751C =
21229312 =
21236310 =
21666210:
2166871 =
2167051C =
21683 10 =
21721 10 =
2175251C =
21768710 =
21866 11 =
21032710 =
2202911, =
22374110 =
2242031n
224391 -
22781310 =
2286691 =
23003251C =
0C"V SAT !7 "4'A U' T, 
,, '~ T AR '
CHESAP-K = "0R P VA
CHOC K FULL C NTS CC
.HC;.rnALL3Y AERN COR
CHRYCLER CORP
CH"CHS RIED CHICKE
I'4C INN\ATI VILACROC
CITY TIVESTING CC
CLARK OIL REFNG SCO
CLUETT PEARCDY r CO
SCOACHMEN INS INC
COASTAL STS GAS CORP
COLDWELL BANKER CO
COLE rO INDS INC
COLE2AN INC
COLLINS FOOCCCS INTL I
COLLINS RADIO CO
C'-OLONIAL PENN GROUP
COLT INDS INC DEL
COLU?'BIA PCTURES IN
0Ok'BI1ED CO.MUNICATI
COMRUSTICN EQUIP ASS
CO'MERCIAL SOLVENTS
COMODORE CCRP
COMMONWEALTH OIL REF
CO~~~rUNICATICNS SATEL
COMPUGRAPHIC CORP
COMPUTER SCIENCES CO
CONE MLS nORP
CONGOLEU. CRP
CONRAC CORP
CON SOL IDATEC FREIGHT
CONTINE"TAL AIR LINE
CONTINENTAL COPPER 
CONTINENTAL CORP
CONTINENTAL ILL CORP
CO>,TINENTAL .'MTG INVS
CONTINENTAL STL CORP
CO'TINENTAL TEL CORP
CONTROL CATA CORP DE
COOPER I NDS INC
COOPER JARRETT INC
COOPER LABS INC
COOPER TIRE S RUBR C
COPELAND CRP
COPPER RANE CO
COPPERWELD CORP
CORCURA CRP
CORNING 3GL.SS WKS
COROON G BLACK CORP
COWLES C.UN I CATION
COX BROACCASTIG CCR
CRANE CO
CROUSE HINDS O
CROWN ZELLRBACH COR
SULLIGAN ITL CO
C
C
C
C
C
C
C.
166 =
167 =
166 =
169 =
170 =
171 =
17? =
!73 =
174 =
175 =
176 =
177 =
178 =
179 =
180 =
181 =
182 =
13 =
134 =
185 
186 =
187 =
188 :
184 =19 =
191 =
193 =I 22
105 =
196 =
107 =
198 =
199 =2 1
200 =
291 =
232 =
203 =
204 
205 =
206 =
297 =
208 =
209 =
21C =
211 =
212 =
213 =
214 =
215 =
216 =
217 =
218 =
2194 =
220 
,·
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
"'
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FILE: C L",. UL LI STDR A ' C:,V S T I N', L ' T 
= 231021 1C
: 23112931
= 3156 11 
= 2321651C
= 2322191 
= 2325251C
= 2332911 
= 2333511
= 2357731C
= 23581110
= 23742410
= 2376881C
= 23810020
2 3 8 1071C
= 23975310
244 1 9 91
= 2452 171.
24783 2C
= 2486311C
= 2487931 
= 2503611C
= 25059510
= 2521651C
= 25243510
= 25246810
= 25274110
= 25357910
= 2538491C
= 25411 11C
= 2546871C
= 25612 1C
= 2570751C
= 25709310
= 25714710
= 2578671C
= 2582371C
= 2583631C
= 26000313
= 262181C
= 26774110
= 2684571C
= 26915 730
= 27033010
= 2761911C
= 27646110
= 27874910
= 2787851
= 2 30751r
= 281 691c
= 28336210
= 2R55511C
= 23643420
= 2911C 011C
= 29117310
= 29121 1C
'! , I ,F S t[ I 4E I jr
CU'INTINliGHA CRU(G STSR
UPrTISS WRIGHT CORP
CUTLER H ER INC
CUTTER LS INC
CYCLOPS CCRP
D P F INC
D W G CORP
DAN RIVER INC
DANA CRP
DART INDS INC
DATA4 GEN CRP
DATAPOINT CCRP
DATAPRODUCTS CORD
DAYTON HUDSCN CORP
DEERE CO
DEL N'ONTE CCRP
DELTEC ITL LTD ENG
DENNISON MFG CO
;ENI'IJYS INC
DESERET PHARMACEUTIC
DE SCTO INC
DEXTER CORP
DI IORGIO CORP
DIAL CORP
DIAM OND SHAMROCK COR
DICTAPHONE CORP
DIGITAL EOUIP CORP
DILLINGHAM CORP
DISNEY WALT PRODTNS
DR PEPPER CC
DOME MINES LTD
DOME PETE LTD
DOMINICK F IC
DONNELLEY R , SONS
DOR IC CORP
DORR OLIVER INC
DOVER CORP
DRUG FAIR INC
DYMO IDS INC
E o C G INC
E SYS INC
EASCO CORP
EASTERN AIR LINES IN
EASTERN GAS FUEL A
ECHLIN MFG CO
ECKERD DRUGS INC DEL
EDISON BROS STORES I
EDLaRDS A G C- SONS 
7L P SC CC
ELECTRONIC ASSOC INC
LS IN ;IATL I 'JDS I] C
EMERY AI R FGHT CORP
EMEPy. 1>405 IS 
EMHAP.T CRP VA
C
C
(
C
C,
221
222
223
224
225
227
22q
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
249
24 1
242
24 3
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
2_52
253
254
255
255
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
27C
271
272
273
274
275
C
r
C
C
C
C-
C.
C
C.
C6'
f?-
.*
-F;
"i
"-:··- -··'4
-I 71.-ji . i
,· i
-103-
FILE: ULM1UL LI ST2?R A CCNVJRSATIN 4 L CP I TR <
276 = 29171310 = E4P I RE G.S CORP
277 = 2928481C = -NSEHAR. II'INECALS 
27'9 = 2933891,3 = T'4 1 BUSINESS FOR '
279 = 293151 = NTEY INC
29% = 294091"10 = E'Y IROTECH C '3
281 = 2944971C = ECU ITABLE GAS 0O
2Q2 = 29647t012 = ES"A.RK INC
C 283 = 2966591C = ESOLIRE ItNC
234 = 29742510 = ESTERLIN CRP
285 = 29765912 = ETHYL CORP
286 = 3036931C = FAIRCHILD CAMERA I
287 = 30371110 = FAIRCHILD INDS INC
298 = 30608410 = FALCON SEABCARD INC
.289 = 30726110 = FANSTEEL INC
20C = 3073511' = FAR WEST FINL CRP
291 = 3073871C = FARIANH FG I'NC
292 = 31322513 = FEDERAL CO
293 = 31354 91 = FEDE1 AL OGUL CORP
294 = 31355610 = FEDERAL NATL TG ASS
295 = 3136931 = F EDEPAL PAPER BRD IN
296 = 31376510 = FEDSAL RES CORP
297 = 3138551C = FEDERAL SIGNAL CRP
C 298 = 31412312 = FEDERATEC EV CO
299 = 3154051 = FERRO CORP
300 = 31571110 = FIRREBOAR CORP
3C01 = 3165491 1 = FIELDCREST LS INC
302 = 3172971 = FILYWAYS INC-
303 = 31731513 = FILTROL CORP
3C4 = 3174951C = FINANCIAL FEDN INC
305 = 3183151C = FIRESTONE TIRE RUB
336 = 31944110 = IRST CHARTER FINL C
t'C 307 = 31945510 = FIRST CHICAGO CORP
308 = 32048810 = FIRST HARTFCRD CORP
309 = 32104510C FIRST MTG INVS
(C. 310 = 33759310 = FISCHER PCRTER CO
3L11 = 33781910 = FISFER FCODS INC
312 = 33802710 = FITHR SCIENTIFIC COC 313 = 3390991C = FLEE-TWOOC ENTERPRISE
314 = 33937612 = FLEXI VAN CCRP
315 = 34063910 = FLORIDA EAST COAST R
C 316 = 3410al1C = FLORIDA PWR LT CO
317 = 34109910 = FLORIDA PWR CORP
318 = 34317210 = FLORIDA STL CORPo: ~319 = 34386110 = FLUCR CORP
320 = 34487210 = FOOTE CONE BELDING
321 = 34551410 = FOREOST MC KESSON I
322 = 34746010 = FORT HOWARD PAPER CO
323 = 3502441 = FOSTER WHEELER CORP
324 = 35160413 = FOXPCRO CO
325 = 3567151C = FREPORT MINERALS C
326 = 35937012 = R1JEHAUF CCRP
327 = 3 12 810 = FUCJ.LA I11CS IJC
328 = 36142:1 *= G . F C~P
329 = 3616061 = F USIrNESS QUIP I
330 = 36464 '1 = SAM PLE SKCOSO INC
f
' C'L V "SAT rA 0'L v . T. y
331 = 3676221C =
332 = 368f30212 =
333 = 3691401C -
334 = 35929 1 =
335 = 3693521 =
3 36 = 3 6955 1 =
337 = 3700641 =-
33 = 37701171 =
339 = 370t2981 
340 = 37033412 =
341 = 37'05141C =
342 = 37062210 =
343 = 3708561C =
344 = 3713521C =
345 = 3724511S =
346 = 37'3291C =
347 = 37371210 =
348 = 37'453212 =
349 = 37'46581C =
350 = 37504613, =
351 = 3757661C =
35 2 = 37'610 1 =
353 = 37735210 =
354z = 37'737910 =
355 = 3793521C =
356 = 37956810 =
357 = 3813171C =
358 = 382338'10 =
359 = 3827481C =
360 = 3834921^ =
361 = 38515410 =
362 = 38741210 =
363 = 3874781 =
364 = 3P92801C =
365 = 3906041C =
366 = 39109010 =
367 = 3'14421C =
368 = 3915141t =
369 = 3923881C =
370 = 3q,304610 =
371 = 4013701C =
372 = 4020641C =
373 = 4024961C =
374 = 4027841C =
375 = 4042451C =
376 = 4058911C =
377 = 40609010 =
378 = 4062161C =
379 = 4083061 
390 = 4102521C =
381 = 4103061C =
382 = 41C3421C =
383 = 41163 1 1C =
384 = 41334213 =
385 = 4136151 =
SATWVAY I NS INC E L
GE.7- AL A-'EvA I NVS I
GE E rAL BATTERY CORP
GEN HAL 4ABL-E 'SRP
ES E L INEMA CRP
-SE'RAL CYN.AMICS COR
"ER L HOST CORP
GENt RAL INS TR C P
GENE .AL tiEO CORP
GENERAL MLS INC
GENERAL PORTLAND INC
GENERAL REFRACTORIES
GENERAL STL INDS INC
GENERAL TIRE RUBR
SEN STAR LTD
GEORGIA P40 COP
aGE%,ER PROS CO
GIANT PORTLA!4D M4S
GIBRALTAR FINL CCRP
,IDDIGS LEWIS INC
GILLETTE CC
I C OS IC
GLEASON WKS
GLEN ALDEN CORP
GLOBAL ARINE INC
GLOBE UN INC
5OLF EN' WEST FINL COR
GOODRICH B F CO
GORCON JEWELRY CORP
GOULD INC
GRANBY MNG LTD
,GRANITE MGMT SVCS IN
GRANITEVILLE CO
GRAY DRUG STORES INC
GREAT LAKES DREDGE 
SRE-AT NORTHN NEKCOSa
GREAT W ESTN FINL COR
GREAT WE STN UTD CCRP
GREATER WASH INVS IN
GREEN GIANT CO
GUARDIAN INS CORP
GULF WESTN INDS IN
GULF RES CHEM CORP
GULTON INDS INC
H M W INDS INC
HALL FRANK B & CO IN
HALL F PRTG CO
HALLIBURTON O
HAMVERMILL PAPER CO
ia1NDLEAtAN CC DEL
HANDY HARS.AN
HANES CORP
HAROURT BR4CE JOVAN
HAR ISCHFEGER CORP
A ? ri HS
.,
!
C
rF"
C.
C
C;
..
C
C..
-
1 -
F T `7 C tjL " U L '' "T "R 1
CO'VE P SAT I C'' NAL r cN T S
3R6 = 413g 7510 =
387 = 4161941C =
38, = 4174041C =
389 = 4198661C =
390 = 42159610 =
391 = 42268620 =
392 = 4228341C =
393 = 4230741C =
394 = 4,2323610 =
395 = 42343410 =
396 = 4234521C =
397 = 42786610 =
398 = 4281821C =
399 = 4298121C =
4C0 = 432341C =
401 = 4344341C =
402 = 43508110 =
4C3 = 4360o210 =
404 = 4376141 =
405 = 4381283C =
4C6 = 44050610 =
407 = 4410611C =
40 = 4410b510 =
409 = 44197410 =
410 = 4415601C =
411 = 44175 81 =
412 = 4422721C =
413 = 44228110 =
414 = 4426721C =
415 = 44485910 =
416 = 4455823C =
417 = 4480961C =
418 = 44e4991C =
419 = 4490061 
420 = 4497441C =
421 = 45138910 =
422 = 4t515421 =
423 = 451h5301 =
424 = 4527221C =
425 = 45303820 =
426 = 4547581C =
427 = 4562991C =
428 = 4566231C =
429 = 45732630 =
430 = 4576411C =
431 = 45765910 =
432 = 45768610 =
433 = 45810 11 0 =
434 = 4587021C =
435 = 4523001 =
436 = 4595061 
437 = 4595731C =
438 = 4596501C =
439 = 459R,841C =
440 = 4600201C =
'ARqPIS CCRP DEL
rlA- T E HANKS COfUUNIC C
HAR TZ TN CCRP
HAZFLTINE CRP
HEFS INC
HEILE.t^N G CREWINS I
HEINZ H J CC
HELENE CURTIS INDS I
HEL E PRCCS INC
HELMERICH1 & PAYNE IN
HERSHEY FOCS CORP
HEUBLEIN INC
HIGH VOLTAGE ENGR 0
HILTON HOTELS CORP
HOFFYMAN ELECTRS CORP
HOLIDAY INNS INC
HOLLY SUGAR CO'P
HOMESTAKE MNG O
HiON1CA MOTOR LTD
HORN HARDART CC
HOSPITAL AFFILIATES
HOSPITAL CORP AMER
HOST INTL INC
HOUSHTON MIFFLIN CO
HOUSE FABRICS INC
HOUSTON AT GAS CORP
HOUSTON CIL MINERP,
HOWARD JHNSON CO
tHUMt.NA INC
HUNT PHILIP A CHEM C
HUSKY OIL LTD
ilUTTON E F ROUP INC
HYDROMET4LS INC
I N A CORP
ID .5C pWp CC
IDEAL BASI INDS INC
IDEAL TOY CRP
IMPERIAL CORP AMER
IMPERIAL CIL LTD
INDIANA GAS INC
INDUSTRIAL NATL CORP
TNEXCO OIL CO
INL ND CCNTAINER COR
INMONT CPP
INSILCO CORP
INSPIRATION CONS COP
INTEGON CGRP
INTERLAKE INC
IN tT:RATI CNAL cUSINE
INTE T I C N AL FLAV OR
I 'NTE R'! T I CN L HAR VE S
INTENATICNAL HLD 3GS
INT-R0NAT I C"-'AL ' I IE RA
INTER.NATIONAL 4N G CO
C
c
C
C
C
C
C
C. - .
C
f.
F I rl_ C 1_ M U LISTOr A
FIL E: UL L LI ST" A
441 = 46325412 =
442 = 4 609' 1C =
4L3 = 4607541C =
444 = 611431 =
445 = 4614.810 =
446 = 4622771 
447 = 4626141C =
448 = 4656321C =
449 = 4656431C =
450 = 47024510 =
451 = 4710161C =
452 = 4710701 C =
453 = 47836610 =
454 = 48003410 =
455 = 4808271C =
456 = 4810831C =
457 = 48251610 =
458 = 483C08 31 =
459 = 4830441 C 
460 = 43306210 =
461 = 4309 810 =
462 = 4840981 =
463 = 4851701C =
464 = 48602 1 C =
465 = 48638610 =
466 = 48731410 =
467 = 48765610 =
468 = 4880441C =
469 = 48917010 =
470 = 4927462C =
471 = 4934221C =
472 = 4937821C =
473 - 49436313 =
474 = 495;901C =
475 = 4976561 =
476 = 50017013 =
477 = 5006G21C =
478 = 50062 01 =
479 = 51 261 =
480 = 503185810 =
481 = 50221010 =
482 = 5024441 =
483 = ;5055 881 =
484 = 5136961C =
485 = 51839010 =
486 = 5218941C =
487 = 92206 1C =
4R8 = 5241921C =
483 = 5248581C =
490 = 5251741 =
491 = 5262641C =
492 = 5273641C =
493 = 5274 802C =
404 = 53'O31 rJl =
495 = 530 331C =
IN T-RNAT I NAL RECTIF
INTERPUBLIC lRCUP CO
INT-STATE BRANS CC
INT-RWAY CP
I.V S TOR S CIVERSIFIE
I OW BE- F PROC SSORS
IPCC HOSP SUDPLY COP
ITEk CORP
ITEL CORP
JAMES FRED S C IN
JANTZEN INC
JAPAN FD INC
JOHNSON CTLS INC
JONES LUGHLIN STL
JORSENSEN EARLE M CC
JOSTENS INC
K L M ROYAL DUTC Ar
KAISER ALUM r CHEM C
KAISER CFEM ; SYPSU M
KAISER INDS CORP
KAISER STEEL CORP
KANE MILLER CORP
KANSJ AS CITY SOUTHN I
KATY INDS INC
KAECKI ERYLCO INDS
KEENE rCORP
KELLR INDS INC
KELLrGOOD CC
KENNMETAL INC
KEWANEE INCS INC
KEYSTONE CONS INDS I
KIDDE WALTER CC IN
KIMEPRLY CLARK CORP
KINGS DEPT STORES IN
KIRCH CO
KOE FRIR I C
KOPPERS IN.C
KORACORP INDS INC DE
KROEHLER MFG CO
L F E CORP
L T V CORP
L V 0 CORP
LACLEDE GAS CO
LAMSON SESSIONS CO
LATROBE STL CO
LEAR SIEGLER INC
LEA SEWAY TRANSN CORP
LEEDS Pc NORTHRUP CO
LEHIGH PCRTL AND CEM'
LEHMAN CCRP
LE JOX .INC
LEV I STRAUSS CC
LEVITZ FURNITURE CrOP
LIEP cY OIENS FORD CO
LIBBY MC NEILL LIB
_ C' cVC E "C T I C I T T ? 
C
C.
C
C
C
C
C.
C
..
C,
C
C
C,
C
FILE: CULV'JL CCtNVE- AT ICN, L VtC ITO , I;
496 = 53037 1 =
497 = 53625713 =
498 = 5 3;2 11 =
49 = 5398211C =
5230 = 544241C =
501 = 54219513 =
502 = 54229010 =
533 = 5435'1C =
504 = 54777913 =
505 = 54927110 =
5C6 = 5496610 =
507 = 5508901C =
508 = 5526531C =
509 = 5527101C =
5 10 = 55371310 =
511 = 5542051C =
512 = 55430713 =
513 = 5545283C =
514 = 5547901C =
515 = 5561391 =
516 = 5574 8 10 =
517 = 55910810C =
518 = 56287610 =
519 = 5641811C =
520 = 56532110 =
521 = 56631 91 =
522 = 5664721C =
523 = 5697131C =
524 = 5711541 =
525 = 57144310C 
526 = 57335310 =
527 = 5743551C =
528 = 5752161C =
529 = 57974610 =
53C = 58003310 =
531 = 5~936451C =
532 = 58123810C =
533 = 5813210 =
534 = 58210310 =
535 = 5322731C =
536 = 58283410 =
537 = 58507210 =
538 = 58574510 =
539 = 586051C =
540 = 59644710C =
541 = 58943310 =
542 = 59018810 =
543 = 5906551C =
544 = 59082510 =
545 = 59160510 =
546 = 5916931 =
547 = 5945031 =
548 = 5947291C =
549 = 595 531 =
550 = 59515210 =
LIs RTY -0RP S C
LIC;;EL CRP
LITTCON I NDS [IC
LOCKHEED CC2L
LOEWS CORP
LODGNTgIN CRP
LONE STAR INDS INC
LOR AL CORP
LOWENqST IN SCNS
LuBRIZOL CCRP
LUKENS STL CO
LYKES CORP
·, C A INC
M E I CORP
* S L INDS INC
. ,' ANDREWS £ FORBES
M;AC CONAL E F CO
MACKE CO
MAC MILLAN INC
4MA-Y R H CO0 INC
AA ISOOI FD INC
MAGIC CHEF INC
MANHiMATTAN INDS INC
MANPOWER I NC
'AR ATHON MFG CO
,4MARCOR INC
'AP EONT CRP
MAR ION LABS INC
MARLEY CC
MARQUETTE CC
MARTIN PROCESSING IN
MARYLAND CUP CORP
MASSEY FERGUSOJ LTD
MC CORD CORP
"'C DERMOTT J RAY C
MC GRAW ILL INC
C !NTYRE MINES LTD
MC iKEE CCRP
M1C LEAN TRUCKING C3
MC LOLTH STL CORP
MEiAD CORP
MEDUSA CCRP
MELVILLE CRP
MEMOREX CRP
MENA!SCO FG CO
"EREDI TH CRP
MERqILL LYNCH & CO I
MESA PETE CC
MES TA ACH CO
MET-RO GOLDwYN M4YER
MET'OED I A INC
,NTICVLIGAN AS UILS C
ICF-IOGAN SUGAR CO
"'IC CO0T INC
'I r COWAVE ASSOC I NC
C
C
C
C
K.
C,
C:
(.,.
C
C
0
C
(.
LI STDR &
1
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E
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1
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FILE: ULU..'~UL LI STPR A CCV-JRSATI[NAL ONITD>: Sr
551 = 59539010 = "I" CO'NTINENT TEL o
C 552 = 52583210 = MIDSLE SCUTH UTILS I
553 = '-37711C = - MICLAND ROSS CORP
554 = 5992921. = 9MILES LAES INC
555 = 60175310 = "ILTON BRACLEY C
556 = 60411010 = MINNESOTA PR S LT C
557 = 60598013 = MISSION INS ROUP IN
' 5rP = 636191 1 = MISSOURI PC CORP
559 = 606193C = ;TISSOURI PAC RR CO
560 = 6 3301 r = 0MOHASCO CCRP
- C 561 = 6381831C = MOIHAWK DATA SCIENCES
562 = 60 830210 = MOHAWK RUBR CO
563 = 60872720 = MOLYBDENITE CORP CDA
·. C; 564 = 6D87441C = 'OLYCORP INC
565 = 60-91501 - = ,ON ARCH MACH TOOL CO
566 = 6097621C = MONCOGRAM, INCS INC DE
567 = 6116621 = MOESANTO CO
568 = 6157981C = f'CO°E MC COPMACK RES
569 = 618441C = OR'RISONh KNUDSEN INC
5 570 = 6190 7 51 C = .'OP.SE S HOE INJC
571 = 61935610 = MORTON NCRWICH PRODS
572 = 6261441 = "UNFORD INr
573 = 62671712 = MURPHY OIL CORP
574 = 6271511C = MURRAY OhIO MFG CO
575 = 62q4542C = MYERS L E CC
576 = 62886210 = N C R CORP
577 = 62915610 : = L INS INC
578 = 6294491C = N V F CO
579 = 62985310 = 'IALCO CHEM CO
58C = 63085410 = NARCO SCIENTIFIC INC
581 = 6312261C = N4ASFUA CRP
C52 = 63243110 = NATIOCNAL AIRLS INC
5R3 = 63256710 = NATIONAL AVIATION 
5P4 = 6348921C = NATIONAL BELLAS HESS
585 = 63512 312 = 'ATIONAL CAN CORP
586 = 6354171C = 'IAT ITONAL CITY LINES
587 = 6361801C = *4 T IONAL FUEL GAS CO
588 = 6362141C = NATIONAL GE CRP
59 = 6363151 0 = 4NATIONAL GYPSUM CO
50C = 63641810 = N'ATIONAL HCmES CORP
591 = 63648610 = NATIONAL INDS INC
5032 = 6368821C = NATIONAL MEC CARE IN
593 = 6368861C = NATIONAL MEC ENTERPR
594 = 6372151C = N'4TIONAL PRESTO INDS
595 = 63774210 = 'IATIONAL STD CO
596 = 6377761C = NATIONAL STARCH CH
57 = 6378441C = 'NATIONAL STL CORP
598 = 6380971C = 'JATIONAL TEA CO
599 = 63835210 = NATIONL UN ELEC COR
6C0 = 63876C1C 'NATCMAS CC
631 = 64021 1C = 'EI SNERS 8ROS INlC
602 = 64074510 = EP TUNE INTL CRP
o_ 603 = 6414231 = 'IE\VAD PwP Sn
604 = 64405212 = NE NGLAND A3 C EL
605 = 6482110 = NEW PROCESS CO
C
C
FILE: CULMUL LI STmR 4
= 65C I1 1 
= 6514271C
= 65163 91
= 6535221C
= 6535561_
= 65638910
= 65678010
= 6570451C
= 6584081C
= 66550010
= 66752810
= 6686051C
= 6687071 0
= 6703461C
= 67140010
= 6745991C
= 6763461 
= 679043 1
= 6 01(6652)
= 6820631C
= 6825051C
= 68900210
= 690,92010
= 6901051C
= 6933631
= 6907341C
= 69076810
= 69149 73 C
= 6935061C
= 6947501C
= 69562910
= 6964801C
= 69764310
= 6980571C
= 69846510
= 6988221C
= 7111110
= 7025441C
= 70905110
= 7099031
= 7113211C
= 71110610
= 71344810
= 7140411C
= 71602610,
= 71645110
= 71654410
= 7165491C
= 71 31671C
= 71 8321C
= 71915110
= 719,651C
= 7201!of1C
= 72447910
= 725106 10 
JEW
,t
YORK TI ES CC
HF LL LC .S FARM ING
ONT ' NG CO2P
.'RA OHAWK PWR 
IAC IAR.A SH CRP
'ORIS RTS S INC
NORTH MERN COAL COR
', ORTH AMERN PHIL IPS
NJOR TH CENT AIRLS INC
NORTHERN NAT GAS CO
NORTHWEST INDS INC
,NORTON CC
NORTON SIMCN INC
NUCOR CORP
OAK INDS INC
OCCIDENTAL PETE CORP
OGDEN CORP
CKLAHOMA NAT GAS CO
CLIN CORP
OM!RK INDS INC
ONE IDA LTD
OTIS ELEVATCR CO
OUTBOARD MARINE CORP
OUTLET CO
OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING
OWENS CORNING FIBERG
OWENS ILL INC
OXFORD INDS INC
P P -S INDS INC
PACIFIC PETES LTD
PAINE WERBER IC
PALM BEACH CO
PAMIDA INC
PAN AMERN WRLD AWYS
DANHNDLE EASTN PIPE
PAP=RCRAFT CORP
PARKER PEN CO
PASCO IlNC
PE'N'YLV NIA PWR L
PENNZOIL CC
DEOPLES DRUG STORES
PEOPLES GAS CO
PEPSICO INC
PERKIN ELMER CORP
PETER PAUL INC
PETRO LEWIS CORP
PETPOLANE INC
PETOLEUv RES CRP
PHILIP MORRIS INC
PHILIPS INDS INC
PHOENIX STL CORP
PICKWICK INTL INC
?IEDCYONT NAT GAS INC
PIT'Y BES INC
DITTSBURGH FORGINGS
C
C
C
C
C
C
Cr`:
.. (
6C6
607
60O
6 1 C9
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
6 26
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
6'54
655
656
657
658
659
660
(
C
C
C
C
:;F 
0
"'.
..
i ;c-ki~4 ~ ~ I~
;r· I·r
'":·G
·'
.i··'"";
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FILE: CLJLAU L I S T A
725701 1 
72578610
72811 71C
731 951 
7324361
73620210
73762 81 
74035121C
7431071C
74449910
74463510
74533210
74579110
74740210C
7497510
74 73 810
75215q 10
7545861C
7547221C
75764010
75 26 01C
75855610
7592001C
75945710
7594661C
76033542' 
7604091
7607791C
76088110
7613391'C
76140610
76152510
7616861 C
76168813
7617631C
7631211,0
7631721C
7664811-
76775410
77055310
7707061C
77379410
77571110
77633510
7766781C
776806 1 C
78024010
789029110
7810881C
7812071
78224220
7835491 
783.781C
784 311 I
78462310
C'V RS4 ATIrCJ'J.A L MC I T,i 
PITTSTON CO
PITTVAY tCRP
L YBOY ENTERPRISES
~'OL 'R ID CRD
PC'nDEROSA SYS INC
PCOPTEC I C
POT LATCH CORP
PREPtIER IL CORP
PRODUCTS RSH CHEM
PUBLIC SVC CO N' MEX
PUBLICKER INDS INC
PUGET SOUND PWR C LT
PULLMAN INC
QUAKER OATS CO
R C A CORP
R T E CORP
RANCO INC
RAY`]ESTOS MANHATTAN
RAYP'OND INTL INC
.ED.... INDS INC
"=EED TOOL CC
REEVES ROS INC
REICHOLD CHEMS INC
REL IANCE ELEC CO
EEt L I ANCE ORCUP INC
REDLLIC CCRP
REPUBLIC FINL SVCS I
REPUBLI STL CORP
E, EARCH COTTRELL IN
REVCO D S INC
REVERE CCPPER ; BRAS
REVLON I NC
REXtHA, CCRP
REX NORD INC
REYNOLDS ETALS CO
RIC ARSDSCN C
ICHARDSCN ERRELL I
RIEEL TEXTILE CORP
RITE AID CP
ROn3ERTSON H H r
1ROB, INS A H INC
ROCKOWER BRCS INC
ROLLINS INC
RONSON CCRD
ROPER CORP
ROSARIO RES CORP
ROYAL CRCWN COLA CO
ROYAL NCS INC
RUBZERA ID INC
"UCKER CO
RUSS TOGS TNC
RYDE P SYS INC
S A SVCS INC
S C CORP
0 S CONS INC
r
C
C
C
C.
661 =
662 =
66h3 =
664 =
665 =
666 =
667 =
668 =
669 =
670 =
671 =
672 =
673 =
674 =
675 =
676 =
677 =
678 =
67 =
680 =
6P81 =
682 =
683 =
684 =
685 =
686 =
687 =
688 =
689 =
690 =
691 =
692 =
693 =
604 =
695 =
606 =
697 =
6q8 =
6 9 =69 =
701 =
702 =
703 =
704 =
705 =
706 =
707 =
708 =
709 =
713 =
711 =
712 =
713 =
714 =
715 =
C
C
C
C
C
C:
C.
C
C
C
C
(
S-iL
: ·
.:-·· ;·':;··
L·"
idr·
nl
FI L : C L;L 'UL rCiVERAT ION'L Ct IT r
716 = 7867S9 
7 17 = 79744 1C =
713 = 799q5010 =
719 = 8006811C =
720 = 30202 1f =
721 = 8020371' =
722 = 8037011C =
723 = 80460310 =
724 = 80461471C =
725 = 8051751C =
726 = 80685710 =
727 = 80912310 =
728 = 8091801C =
729 = 8097411 =
730 = 81062310 =
731 = 8113692C =
732 = 8115171C =
733 = 8116411C =
734 = 81196213 =
735 = 8120991C =
736 = 3125571C =
737 = 8177151C =
738 = 81913910 =
739 = 8194701C =
740 = 8208631C =
741 = 8226351C =
742 = 8227372C =
743 = 82434813 -=
744 = 8261832C =
745 = 82641410 =
746 = 82662210 =
747 = 82867510 =
748 = 8287631 =
749 = 8301641^ =
750 = 83064310 =
751 = 33083310 =
752 = 3211010C =
753 = 83269613 =
754 = 83408610 =
755 = 8357161C =
756 = 84129710 =
757 = 84316310 =
758 = 8434561C =
759 = 84367310 =
760 = 8440281r =
761 = 84723510 =
762 = 8475411C =
763 = 84933910 =
764 = 85178310 =
765 = 95256310 =
766 = 8538191C =
767 = 3538731C =
768 = 85410610 =
760 = 85423110 =
770 = 546161C =
SAGa COR'
SANI CIEGO GAS ELEC
SAJ ERS aS.SrC INC
SAN-JSI'MO E LEC CO
SAWTA F IN CS INC
SA!N TA FE I"TL CORP
SA.GE:.NT w~EL-H SCINT
S4V 4 STCP INC
SAV ON DRUGS INC
SAVIN USINESS A14CHS
SCHLUMBERGER LTD
SCOA INDS INC
SCO3 LAD FCCOODS INC
SCOTT FORESM-aN ; CO
SCOTTYS IC
SE- CONTAINERS INC
SEAP.OARD CCA4T LINE
SE4_CARC WORLD AIRLS
SEa GRAVE CORP
SEALECTRC CORP
SEATRAIN LINES INC
Sq VOMATION CORP
SH AKESPEARE CO
SHAPELL INDS INC
SHE AR SON HAYCEN STON
SHELL OIL CC
SHELLER GLBCRE CORP
SHERWIN ILLIAMS CO
SIEGEL HENRY I INC
SIEPRA PAC INDS
SIGNAL CCS INC
SIMPONDS PRECISICN P
SIMON &. SCHUSTER INC
SKACGGS COS INC
SKI L CORP
SKYLINE CORP
SMITH INTL INC
SMUCKER J M CO
SOLA BASIC INIDS INC
S00 LINE RR CO
SOUTHDOWN INC
SOUTHERN INC GAS & E
SOUTHERN NAT RES INC
SOUTHERN RY CO
SCUTHERN UNION CO
SP RTON CORP
SPECTOR INDS INC
SPRAGUE LEC CO
SPR INGS M'LS TIC
STA LEY A E MFG C O
STANDARD PRESSED STL
STANDARD PRUDENTIAL
STANDARD SHS INC
STANDEX INTL CORP
ST. NLE Y ^KS
C
C
.
C
C
C
K
(2
C
C
C
C,
C
CG
C
L I TPDR 
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FILE: CULY', JL LIST RQ A
= 85772110
= 8583751 C
= 36316310
= 86130410
= 8615721 
-= 86 158912
= R,2.9712
= 863%6310
= 8666451C
= 86671312
= 8667621C
= 86732310
= 8680351C
3= 6844313
= 86 901 92 
= 69 71 61 
- 8716161C
= 7'2 64 91 
= 8746871C
= 87512710
= 8753821C
= 8760431C
= 878 5 1 2 1 C
= 87852110
= 8785421C
= 8791311'
= 8791991C
= 87933510
= 87986210
- 8 1 60 9ql C
= 8816941C
= 88249110
= 8825081C
= 8892931
= 88261031
= 83289510
= 884Lj 2 1C
= 8847531C
= 88634B1C
= 88 642310
= 89673512
= 8872241C
= 8873601C
= 83917510
= 8902781C
= 8905161C
891508 1 C
= 234810
= P.92 89 21C
= 3933491 
= 8934851C
= 89355313
= 8938471
= 394l151f
= 8954351C
rC'CV-mS&ATTC.6AL TrIT SY
= ST 1FF CfHEl" CO
= STEEL 0 CA LTD
T VE'. S J P g CO IC
= STCOJL VAN CAMP I""C
= STONE & EBSTER INC
= STONE CONTAINER CORP
= STOP S SHCP COS INC
= TUC3B KER ORTH IN GT
= SUl 2HE M CCRP
= SUN ELEC CORP
= SUN INC
= SUNDSTRAND CORP
= SUPER VALU STORES IN
= 2UPER\ARKETS GEN COR
= SURVEYOR FD INC EL
= SWNK IN
= SYNTEX CRP
=T R W I NC
= TALLEY IDS INC
= TAMPA ELEC CO
= TANDY CORP
= TAPPAN CO
= TECFNICARE CORP
= TECItNICOLOR INC
= TECHNICOh CCRP
= TEK TRONIX INC
= TELAUTOGRAPH CORP
= TELEDYNE INC
= TEMPLE INDCS INC
= TESORO PETE CORP
= TEXACO INC
= TEX S INDS INC
= TEXAS INSTRS INC
= TEXAS OIL SAS CORP
= TEXAS PAC LC TR
= TEXFI I CS IC
= THICKOL CCP
= THOPSO J ALTER C
= TICCR
= TIDEWATER INC
= TIGER INTL INC
= TIME INC
= TIMES MIRROR CO
= TCLEDO ECISCN CO
= TONI<A ORP
TOOTSIE ROLL INCS IN
= TOTAL PETE NORTH AME
= TRr -COR INC
= TIRANE CO
= TRA'S WORLD AIRLS IN
= TrPASAMERICA CORP
= TRSCO1 LINES
= TANSOH-I C FINL -CP
= TR SWAY INTL CORP
= T2I CONTL CCRP
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
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787
788
789
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791
7q2
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8C7
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810
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813
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827 = P958951C =
828 = 8965221C =
829 = Q970931 =
33 = 8.3831C =
831 = 9012211C =
832 = 9921201C =
333 = 9321 210 =
834 = 90255010 =
835 = 90268610 =
836 = 9028731C =
837 = 9032001C =
838 = 9034221C =
839 = 90344310 =
840 = 90427410 =
841 = 90553 1 =
842 = 9055811C =
843 = 90791g1C =
844 = 9093131" =
845 = 9096631 =
846 = 9101110 =
847 = 9103141^ =
848 = 9134849C =
849 = 91056210 =
85F = 91063710 =
851 = 91067110 =
852 = 9106810C =
853 = 9112131 =
854 = 91135813 =
355 = 91153610 =
856 = 911 82 51 =
857 = 91184210 =
858 = 21202710 =
859 = 9121231C =
863 = Q126051C =
861 = 91265610 =
862 = 9127751C =
863 = 9133531C =
864 = 91731-31C =
865 = 91819510 =
866 = 91 31410 =
867 = 9222041G =
868 = 92227210 =
869 = 92552610 =
870 = 92916010 =
871 = 92 97691 =
872 = 9297941C =
873 = 9323551C =
874 = '3316910 =
875 = 93369610 =
876 = 93405110 =
877 = 93440 1C =
e78 = 93443610 =
879 = 93833710 =
90 = 9396491 =
C 'Va r T T !I NL M Cr!, I T ,
T RI A"IGLE IS I"'C
TR!N"lGL' PAC CRP
T INITY I S I C
TROPICANA PRODS INC
TUC SON 43S 6; ELEC CO
TWENTIETH CE'TY FOX
TYC LA S INC
TYLR CORP
U A L INC
U G I CORP
U M C INDS INC
U O P INC
U V tINDS INC
/ARCO INC DEL
UN qCO INDS INC EL
UNION CAMP CORP
UNION CARBICE CORP
UNICN PAr CRP
UN ITED AIRCR AFT PROC
UNI TED BRANCS CO
UNITED CORP
UNITED FINL CORP CAL
UNITED GAS CORP
UIT ED STY CORP
UNITED ILLUM CO
UNJI TED I NL CORP
UNITED INNS INC
UNITED NUCLEAR CORP
UNITED REFNG CO
UNI TED STS P FGN SEC
UN I TED STS FID GTY
UNITED STS FILTER CO
UN I TED STS GYPSUM CO
UNITED STS LEASING I
UNITED S TS SHOE CORP
UNITED STS STL CCRP
UNITED STS TOB CC
UNIVAR CORP
.JSL IFE CORP
V C A CORP
V S r CORP
VARIAN ASSC INC
VARO INC
VIACOM I NTL INC
VULCAN MA TLS CO
WAC HOVI4 CCRP
WACKENHUT CORP
WALLACE 'URRAY CORP
WALTER JIt CORP
WANO LAOS INC
WARC FOODS INC
WA!>NER f SWASEY CO
WARNER C0NMUNICATIrnN
WASHTNGTOCN GAS LT CC
WASFIi4GGTTCN POST CO
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= 40144 1C
= 941 631
= 94701 1 
= 9471511,
= 9474231C
= 9508171C
= 9554651C
= 95751810
9575861C
= 95804310
= 9590901C
= 95926550
= 9615481C
= 6199093
= 9621661C
= 9 62892 
= 9631531C
= 96362610
= 9640601r
= 96668010
= 9574431C
= 9746371C
= 9758761C
= 97738510
= 9774801C
= 9790971C
= 9781651C
= 98006510
= 9808811 
= 9825941C
= 19412110
= 98413 8C
= 9388571C
= 9890701C
= 93939910
= 9 95691C
= 989241C
= ASHINGT CN STL CRP
= 
'4A TE Mv 'T IC
= 'AN LTD I'iC
= WE THER HEA C rO
= WEB£ DEL E CORP
= IWESCO F INL r3RP
= ;WEST POINT PEPPERELL
= WES TCO ST TR ANSM I SS I
= ESTERN AIR LINES IN
= WESTERN CO NORTH AE
= ESTERN PAC INDS IC
= WESTERN PUFG INC
= WESTVACO CC9P
= WESTMORELANC INC
: WEYERHAEUSER CO
= WHEELABRATCR FRYE IN
= WHEELING PITTSBURGH
= WHITE CONS INDS INC
= WHITE MTR CCRP
= WHITTAKER CCRP
= wIC I ES CC P
= WINNEBAGO INDS INC
= WINTER JACK INC
= WITCO CHEP CORP
= WITTER DEAN ORGANIZA
= WOLVERINE WCRLD WIDE
= WOMETCO ENTERPRISES
= wOODS CORP
= WOOLWORTH F W CO
= WURLITZER CC
= XERCX CORP
= XTRA CORP
= ZALE CORP
= ZAPATA CCRP
= ZENITH R IC CORP
= ZIMER HES CORP
= ZURN INDS INC
C
C
C
C
;3 R 2
8 3883
3 85
3 86
887
888
889
99C
8391
892
893
8 94
895
396
897
98
899
900
0 3
904
9 C 5
(? 0 6
9 07
908
909
91 0
9 11
9 12
13
9 14
9 15
9 16
9 17
C
C
C
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C
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c
C-
C
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SAMPLE PORTFOLIO
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3 23
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I = -403 I I
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,' 7 33 Nj
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Appendix II
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
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PROGRAM 1 EXEC FILE
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PROGRAM 2 EXEC FILE
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND EQUASIONS
Alpha (). The alpha is the intercept of the
regression line on the verticle axis. A positive alpha
indicates Value Line has earned, on the average, a premium
above that expected for the level of market variability.
It's expected value is zero.
Beta (). Beta is the regression coefficient of
the rate of return on the market in the market molded
equasion
R1 = + BiRm + i
Correlation coefficient (p). This is a measure
of the degree to which two variables move together
P,2 = 1- S1.2.2
Si2
Covariance (cov,y). Another measure of degree
two variables move together. A positive covariance measures
on merge the variables move together
Z (xi - x) (x - x2 )
N
Efficient market. In an efficient market, current
security prices fully reflect all available information.
Efficient portfolio. A fully diversified portfolio.
-149-
Geometric mean. A geometric mean is the Nth root
of N observations.
Least square regression line. A least square
regression line minimizes the sum of the square of the ver-
ticle deviations from observations points.
xi = a + bxy
Risk free rate. The risk free rate is the rate
of return on virtually riskless assets, usually Treasury
Bills.
t-statistic. A measure of statistical significance.
An absolute value of 2 or greater is good.
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